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ABSTRACT

Recent advances in VLSI/WSI technology have led to the design of processor
arrays with a large number of processing elements confined in small areas. The
use of redundancy to increase fault-tolerance has the effect of reducing the ratio
of area dedicated to processing elements over the area occupied by other resources
in the array. The assumption of fault-free hardware support (switches, buses,
interconnection links, etc.,), leads at best to conservative reliability estimates.
However, detailed modeling entails not only an explosive growth in the model
state space but also a difficult model construction process. To address the latter
problem, a systematic method to construct Markov models for the reliability
evaluation of processor arrays is proposed. This method is based on the premise
that the fault behavior of a processor array can be modeled by a Stochastic Petri
Net (SPN). However, in order to obtain a more compact representation, a set of
attributes is associated with each transition in the Petri net model. This
representation is referred to as a Modified Stochastic Petri Net (MSPN) model. A
MSPN allows the construction of the corresponding Markov model as the
reachability graph is being generated. The Markov model generated can include
the effect of failures of several different components of the array as well as the
effect of a peculiar distribution of faults when the reconfiguration occurs. Specific
reconfiguration schemes such as Successive Row Elimination (SRE), Alternate
Row-Column Elimination (ARCE) and Direct Reconfiguration (DR), are analyzed
t This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant DC18419745 and in part by the Innovative Science and Technology Office of the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization and was administered through the Office of Naval Research under
contracts No. 00014-85-k-0588 and No. 00014-88-k-0723.
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in detail. Randomization techniques are used to solve the inherently large models
that can be generated via a MSPN representation. A model reduction technique
based on the discrimination of states with low mean holding times is discussed.
Finally, an analysis of hierarchical structures formed with variations of the
schemes analyzed, is presented. The results reported in this work were obtained
using MGRE (Model Generation and Reliability Evaluator) which is a software
package designed to analyze fault-tolerant processor arrays for which a MSPN
representation is given.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Objectives
Recent advances in YLSI/WSI technology have led to the design of processor
arrays with a large number of processing elements (PE’s) confined in small areas.
At wafer level, the elimination of interchip connections and faster signal
propagation due to shorter interconnections between PE’s results in higher
processing speed. However, large densities and hardware Complexity increase the
likelihood of faults during the fabrication process. In addition, a large number of
active elements involved in a single computation cycle, increases the possibility of
failures at any time during the operational life of the array. Increased likelihood
of faults during the fabrication process results in low production yield whereas
large number of active elements involved in the functional operation of the array,
decreases reliability. Research efforts have been directed not only to yield
improvement but also to increase fault-tolerance [KoB84,KoP87]. To increase
both yield and reliability, several reconfiguration algorithms which use the
available redundancy in the array have been proposed. In addition, fault
detection and recovery upon the occurrence of faults is required during the
fabrication process or the functional operation of the array. Because of their
susceptibility to faults and the added hardware complexity on the overall array,
components other than processing elements become very important In the analysis
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of fault-tolerant processor arrays. However, there is a tendency to limit the
reliability analysis of processor arrays to failures of processing elements only
[RaA84]. The assumption of fault-free support hardware in the form of switches,
buses, interconnection links, etc., for the analysis of fault-tolerant processor
arrays leads at best to conservative reliability estimations. The need to construct
more general models is recognized in the mathematical framework derived by
Koren et

al

[KoB84,KoP87,KoP86]

to evaluate yield improvement and

performance-related measures of different array architectures.
A number of analytic models and methods for the reliability analysis of fault
tolerant computer systems currently exists [Tri85,GeT83,HiE83]. Combinatorial
analysis and Markov models are the most common methods used to deyelop
analytical models for the reliability analysis of fault tolerant systems. In the case
of combinatorial methods, if the system can be divided into several modules, they
are assumed independent (i.e. no faults or repair dependencies exist) and
reliability estimations can be derived using fault trees and series-parallel
structures for which definite mathematical tools exist [Tri82]. Markov models on
the other hand offer the alternative of analyzing systems with interdependent
components. A fault-tolerant processor array can be considered a system with
interdependent components in the sense that the failure of one component may or
may not affect other components of the array. The manner in which the
components of the array are interdependent varies with the topology implemented
and the reconfiguration algorithm that takes place when a faulty component is
detected.
In this work the problem of evaluating the reliability of processor arrays
using Markov models is addressed. However, a detailed modeling that takes into
consideration failure interdependencies of several components, entails not only an

.

.
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explosive growth in the model state space but also a difficult model construction
process. To address the latter problem, a systematic method to construct Markov
models for the reliability evaluation of processor arrays is proposed. This method
is based on the premise that the fault behavior of a processor array can be
modeled by a Stochastic Petri Net (SPN). In order to achieve a complete mapping
from places and transitions in an SPN-like representation of small size to states
and transition rates in the Markov model, a modified version of SPN’s is
proposed. However a more compact representation is obtained by associating a set
of attributes with each transition in the Petri net. This representation is referred
to as a Modified Stochastic Petri Net (MSPN) model. The set of attributes
includes a probability function such that the effect of faulty spares in the
reconfiguration algorithm is captured each a time a configuration change occurs.
This distribution includes the probabilities of survival given that a number of
components required by the reconfiguration process is faulty. Depending on the
type of component and the reconfiguration scheme, probabilities of survival can
be determined using closed form expressions or via simulation. Reconfiguration
schemes such as Successive Row Elimination (SRE) Alternate Row-Column
Elimination (ARCE) [FoR85] and Direct Reconfiguration (DR) [SaS86a],[ SaS86b]
are analyzed in detail using MSPN’s.
Once the Petri net model and the corresponding reachability graph have
been obtained, all the information required to build the transition matrix of the
corresponding Markov chain is available. At this stage, figures of merit such as
reliability, performability, etc., can be readily addressed. Reliability evaluation
tools such as ARIES [MaA82] and SHARPE [ShT86] can be used to evaluate the
models developed here. However the use of these packages is limited to the
evaluation of models with a relatively low number of states. To circumvent the
problems involved in the numerical evaluation of large models, a software
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implementation based on the randomization procedure, has been used to generate
the reliability results reported in this work. A software package (MGRE) has
been developed [Lop89] to analyze fault-tolerant processor arrays based on the
approach presented in this report. By the execution of appropriate commands,
MGRE can generate Markov models, evaluate reliability and MTTF given the size
of the processor array and a set of failure rates.

1.2. Overview
In the second chapter the main topic of this report is developed. A modified
version of stochastic Petri nets is presented and its application is illustrated by
the generation of a model corresponding to the SRE reconfiguration scheme. In
the third chapter the ARCE and DR reconfiguration schemes are analyzed in
detail. Also, expressions required to calculate probabilities of survival in the
presence of faults, are derived. Results concerning the state space and reliability
analysis of these schemes are also reported. The fourth chapter discusses software
algorithms for the numerical evaluation of large Markov models. In chapter five,
several hierarchical configurations are compared with respect to their MTTF and
reliability performance.

CHAPTERH
MODIFIED STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS

2.1. Introduction
As is the case with many systems, Markov models can be used to evaluate
the reliability of processor arrays. However, reliability estimations are mostly
based only on the failures of processing elements [RaA84]. Components other
than processing elements become very important in the analysis of fault-tolerant
processor arrays because of their susceptibility to faults and the added hardware
complexity of the overall array. This fact has played an important role in the
derivation

of

a

mathematical

framework

developed

by

Koren

et

al

[KoB84,KoP86,KoP87] to evaluate yield improvement and performance-related
measures of different array architectures. However, a detailed modeling of faulttolerant processor arrays, which explicitly takes into consideration the failure
statistics of each component as well as their possible interdependencies, entails
not only an explosive growth in the model state space but also a difficult model
construction process. Therefore, in this chapter the latter problem is emphasized
and a systematic method to construct Markov models to evaluate the reliability of
processor arrays is discussed. This method is based on the premise that the fault
behavior of a processor array can be modeled by a Stochastic Petri Net (SPN)
However, in order to obtain a more compact representation, a set of attributes is
associated with each transition in the Petri net model. The resulting model is
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referred to as a Modified Stochastic Petri Net (MSPN) representation. An MSPN
representation allows the construction of the corresponding Markov model as the
generation of the reachability graph takes place. Included in the set of attributes
associated with each transition in a MSPN, is a discrete probability distribution
such that the effect of faulty spares in the reconfiguration algorithm is captured
each time a configuration change occurs.

This distribution includes the

probabilities of survival given that a number of components required by the
reconfiguration process are faulty. Depending on the type of component and the
reconfiguration scheme, probabilities of survival are determined using simulation
or closed form expressions.
Once the Petri net model and the corresponding reachability graph have
been obtained, all the information required to build the transition matrix of the
corresponding Markov chain is available. At this stage, figures of merit such as
reliability, performability, etc., can be readily addressed. Reliability evaluation
tools such as ARIES [MaA82] and SHARPE [ShT86] can be used to evaluate the
models developed here.
The second section of this chapter discusses some basic notation and
concepts related to array configurations. An SPN representation is derived using
as an example the SRE reconfiguration scheme. The third section of this chapter
discusses Modified Stochastic ij’etri Nets (MSPN’s) and an MSPN representation
for the SRE scheme is derived;j also a procedure to construct MSPN’s is outlined.
In the fourth section, the correspondence between markings in an MSPN
representation and the states in a Markov chain is described; a procedure to
construct the reachability graph of a given MSPN is outlined.

i
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2.2. Concepts and Notation
In this section a representation of array configurations using a SPN is
discussed. For illustration, examples using the SRE reconfiguration scheme are
presented.

2.2,1. Array Configurations
To analyze a fault-tolerant array architecture with k types of components,
the configuration of an array is represented as a k-tuple:
C» = (*7it> %«>

,Vki)

* = 0 , 1, * * * ,

where ?//,• denotes the number of elements of component type / and C is the set of
all possible configurations of the array. Examples of component types include
processing elements, links, switches, spare links and spare processing elements.
The occurrence of faults and the application of the reconfiguration algorithm
define a sequence of configurations that begins with C0 as the initial
configuration; any other configuration can correspond to the failure state or an
operational state of the array. The latter will be referred to as an operational
configuration.
Upon detection of a faulty component, the reconfiguration algorithm may
not send the array to an operational configuration if any of the following
happens:
1)

The reconfiguration circuitry failed. This possibility can be considered
through a coverage factor (denoted by c) defined as the probability of
successful reconfiguration given that a fault has occurred [BoC69|. This is a
measure of the probability of successful operation of all circuitry related to
fault detection, isolation and reconfiguration. The coverage factor is assumed
constant and it will be associated with failures of active components only.

.
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2)

Redundancy is exhausted. This information can be inferred from (7,-.

3)

The presence of faults in non-active components (redundancy) hinders a
successful reconfiguration. Redundant components are present in C*,- as spare
processing elements, spare switches, spare links, spare buses, etc. Some of
these components become active in the new configuration.
In a given configuration with a number of faulty components, successful

reconfiguration will depend not only on the type of faults but also on their
distribution in the array. Thus, the probability of correct reconfiguration in the
presence of faults is referred to as the probability of survival [SaS86b]. Because
the reconfiguration algorithm may choose one of several new configurations
(including a non-operational one), a probability is assigned to each possible new
configuration. The probability of survival corresponds to the sum of probabilities
assigned to new operational configurations.

2.2.2. SPN Representation
While Markov models provide an analytical basis to derive reliability
estimations of complex systems, their inherently large state space is difficult to
construct and cannot be directly described in a convenient manner. On the other
hand, SPN’s provide a succinct representation of the system and support a
mechanized construction of the Markov model, because markings in an SPN
correspond- bijectively to states in the Markov chain [Mol82]. In the case of
fault-tolerant processor arrays, an operational configuration corresponds to an
operational state in the Markov chain; thus, to derive all possible operational
configurations of the array, a marking in the SPN must correspond to an
operational configuration of the array. Each place p,- identifies components of type
i and, at a given marking Mg, the number of tokens m,9 corresponds to

which
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is the number of components of type ». Two or more distinct component types
may identify the same physical component; for example, a physical spare is a
component of the type "active spare" when it is used to replace a faulty part and
it is a component of the type "non-active spare" otherwise.
Consider for example an »Xn array that supports the Successive-RowElimination (SRE) reconfiguration scheme with a layout as in Figure 2.1. The
SRE scheme as presented in [FoR85], is based on the successive elimination of
rows. Row elimination is done by using switches (S’s) and redundant links to
bypass all processing elements (PE’s) of any row containing at least one faulty PE
or at least one faulty horizontal link (HL) or at least one faulty input/output link
(IOL); spare bypass links (SBL’s) become active bypass links (BL’s) which are used
to bypass faulty rows; the array fails when rows are exhausted or if either one
active bypass link or a switch fails. A marking q is described as:
Mq = (#PE,#IOL,#S,#BL,#HL,#SBL) = (mlq,m2q,m3q, . . . , m6f)
where the symbol n=^M is used to denote "number of".
A possible SPN representation is given in Figure 2.2. The firing of t\,
represents the occurrence of a fault in a PE, a fault in an IOL is represented by
the firing of t2 and so on. In general, the firing of f,- represents a fault occurrence
in a component of type i where 1<* <A; and k is the number of places and
transitions. In SRE, component types 1 through 6 correspond to PE, IOL, S, BL,
HL, SBL and A:—6, respectively.
A

Input and output places with respect to

represent the effect of a fault on

the corresponding components; i.e., each transition

involves a set of I/O

functions A,- — {/(£,), 0(i,)} and a set V,- of multiplicities fj, such that when A;
fires in Mqr the number of tokens m/? in each place p/eA,- is modified as follows:
mij = miq-ix\ + nf
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Figure 2.1. Schematic Layout of the SRE Structure

where m/y is the modified number of tokens in pi in a new marking My. If p,f = 0,
Pi is only an input place and if A = 0, pi is only an output place. For example in
Fig. 2.2, the failure of a PE (ti), affects the following components: PE’s, IOL’s,
HL’s, SBL’s and BL’s; therefore, a set of input and output places with respect to
i 1 is given as:

|
Al ={{pi,P2,P5,P&},{P4}}

Assuming an nXn processor array, the set of multiplicities associated with Ai is
given as:
Vi— {A = n; A = 2n; A = » - 1; A — n;

= n}.

If less than the number of spares required for reconfiguration are available, then
the array fails to reconfigure and the resulting marking is characterized by the
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fact that mg < 0. The negative value of m& can be used to identify a failure
marking reached due to exhaustion of spares. Some schemes require that specific
transitions be enabled or disabled depending on the current configuration and the
reconfiguration algorithm. Assume for example, that not only rows but also
columns are eliminated during the reconfiguration process. In these cases, each pi
becomes a function of the current marking; e.g., //{ equals the number of columns
in the current configuration. Hence, in order to include all possible cases, p/ must
be regarded as a variable multiplicity (this concept is an extension of the usual
notion of "multiplicities" in Petri Net theory).
Although the SPN in Fig. 2.2, might provide the number of operational
configurations required, it fails to consider the cases when enough spares are
available but reconfiguration cannot take place (due for example to a peculiar
distribution of faults). As a consequence, this approach might provide overly
optimistic reliability estimates. Conceivably, a different SPN model can be used to
accurately represent the dependency of successful reconfiguration on fault
distributions. However, such an SPN would itself consist of a very large number
of places and transitions which increases with the size of the array. One of the
intents in this chapter is to provide an extension of the SPN concept so that
dependence on fault-distribution can be accounted for in a model with a
complexity comparable to that of Figure 2.2 regardless of the size of the array
and reconfiguration scheme used.

2.3. MSPN Representation
The fact that several types of faults affect the array in the same manner,
suggests the possibility of a more compact SPN-like representation, which is
referred to as Modified SPN (MSPN). A MSPN takes into account different fault
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Figure 2.2. SPN of the SRE Scheme

distributions by associating with each transition i,-, a set of attributes described as
follows:
t{: <P{x | Mq, £,•), Si(Mq), B{t c{>
where:
P(x | Mq, tf) defines a discrete probability function where x represents a
random marking My in a set R directly reachable from a particular marking
Mq; the notation Pr'qj is used to denote the probability of reconfiguration
P(x — Mj | Mq, ti), i.e., the probability that the net is in marking My after f,fires when the net is in marking Mq.

The advantage of assigning a

probability function to each transition f,-, is the ability to determine correct
transition rates between states in the corresponding Markov model as the
reachability graph is being generated. Thus, when

fires, one value of the

probability function is assigned to the marking generated, another value is
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assigned to another marking that can be generated by the immediate firing
of a possibly different transition and so on. This sequence of firings is
dictated by the current marking and the reconfiguration scheme modeled.
Notice that the markings generated could have been generated previously
and the probabilities of reconfiguration are only used to modify the
transition rates;
Si(Mq) is a sequence of transitions that will fire immediately after i,- fires. If
no immediate firing is required then Si(Mq) is a null sequence. Depending on
the reconfiguration scheme, 5,- can be unique for all markings or is
determined in terms of Mq;
Bi is a Binary Transition Vector with k elements 6/ such that, 6/ = 1 if the
failure of the Ith component triggers the transition ft* and 6/ = 0 otherwise.
This vector is used to identify those components that can trigger the
corresponding transition £t-; it facilitates the merging of non-distinct
markings, the derivation of probability transition vectors (defined in section
2.4) and the derivation of flags (i.e., failure rate conditions) that signal a

^possible non-occurrence of a transition;
The term

is a coverage factor associated with £,*, such that if £t- is triggered

by the failure of a spare (inactive) component then c,- = 1; thus, the
possibility of array failure at the time that one of these components fails is
non-existent; if £,• is triggered by the failure of an active component then ct*
corresponds to the probability of detection given that a fault occurs (i.e.,
c, < !).

To illustrate the set of transition attributes just discussed, consider the SRE
A

scheme in Fig. 2.1 and the SPN of Fig. 2.2. Since

A

A

and £5, have the same

. . 16effect on the array, a single transition ty is defined in a MSPN with a vector
By — [110 0 1 0] to indicate that either the failure of a PE, IOL or a HL, can
A

A

cause ty to fire. Likewise, t3 and f4 become t2 with a vector B2 = [00 1 1 0 0].
The firing of t2 represents the failure of a BL or a S either of which is fatal.
Transition fg becomes t2 and represents the failure of a SBL with a vector
#3 =[00000 1].

Consider now the case when a given operational configuration contains faulty
SBL’s. The probability that none of them lies in the row that is eliminated when

ty fires, corresponds to the probability of reconfiguration Pr\j. If at least one
SBL is faulty in the row deleted, the array fails to reconfigure with a probability
PrXgj = 1—Prlqj (the failure marking is denoted as Mf). In general, probabilities of
reconfiguration are complicated functions of the characteristics of each
reconfiguration

scheme

(e.g.,

replacement

rules,

hardware

requirements,

dependencies on fault distributions, etc.) and the size and shape of the array.
They must be derived for each scheme and in some cases extensive simulation is
required due to the complexity of the combinatorial analysis involved. Examples
where suitable expressions can be derived include SRE, ARCE and DR. Since
different markings may correspond to different number of SBL’s, Pr\j is a
function of the current marking (i.e., Mq). Let Ps denote the probability of
survival, then for SRE, Ps = Prjy and can be estimated via equation (3.8) or (3.9)
which are derived in chapter 3 in terms of the number AT of faulty SBL’s, present
in the current marking Mq. Some transitions in a MSPN will exhibit a dual
nature: they can be fired exponentially or immediatedly; once a transition fires
exponentially, a sequence of immediate firings (specified by 5,) of possibly
different transitions may follow. Therefore, in SRE, when ty fires exponentially,

t2 will fire immediately to generate a failure marking and Sy = (t2). This follows
from the fact that when ty fires, the required SBL’s become BL’s and if one of
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them is faulty 12 fires immediately. When i2 or ^3 fire exponentially no
immediate sequence is required and 52 and £3 are null sequences. It will be seen
that in some applications such as ARCE, the sequence of immediate firings is not
unique as it is selected depending on the current marking.

Bl = [110010], B2 = [001100], j93 = [000001]
Pr2qj =Pr\j=l,c<A,Pr\j=Ps as given in Ch. 3

Figure 2.3. MSPN of the SRE scheme

Considering the coverage factors, the sets of attributes associated with the
transitions in the MSPN of the SRE scheme, are summarized in Figure 2.3.

2.3.1. I/O Places and Variable Multiplicities
Associated with each tj in the MSPN there is a set of I/O places
Aj =

0(£,)} and a set of multiplicities:
V*i={ri,njl\pie{l{ti)},pke{0(ti)}}

Two transitions in the SPN, can have the same set of I/O places and
different set of multiplicities; i.e. two distinct faults may affect the same
components in different ways. In order for distinct transitions in the SPN to be
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merged in a single transition in the MSPN, they must have the same set of I/O
places and the same set of multiplicities. Because a coverage factor is associated
with each transition in the MSPN, components whose failures fire a given
transition must all correspond to either active or non-active components only (i.e.,
components of both types can not be present).
Example 2.1: Consider the SPN in Fig. 2.2. The failure of a PE (<i), the
failure of a IOL (£2) or the failure of an HL (£5) affect the same components of
the array and the set of multiplicities for each set of arcs is the same; therefore
transitions £1} £2 and £5 can be merged into a single transition
^1= {

such that

0(^)1 = Ax = A2 = As = {{pi,p2,P5,P&}, {P4}}

and
V[ = Vx = V2 = V5 = {/if = n; i4 = 2n; [x{ = n- 1; A = n; A = n}.
Likewise, A3 = A4; i.e., the failure of either a S or a BL (£3 or £4) causes the
array to fail affecting all components in the same way; i.e., transitions £3 and £4
can be merged into a single transition t2 such that
A2 = {/(i2), 0(t2)} = {{p 1 j P 2 > P 3 >P 45P5>P6}> 0}
and a set of multiplicities
Vg=V3 = V4= {/if = H=PEq; A = #JO/g; A =.#5g; /if = #BLq] A =
/4 = #S£L9};

Finally, we have that the failure of a SBL (ig) affects only SBL’s; i.e.,
A3

- {/(i3)» 0(^)} = ^6 = {{Pe}, {0}} with V3 = V6 = {/i6 = 1}

where £3 in the MSPN replaces Iq. □.
In summary, an MSPN model is an extension of a SPN with the purpose of
representing fault-tolerant processor arrays and can be defined as follows:
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MSPN = (P, T, A, M, Pr, Sq, B, Cv)
where Pr is a set of probability functions P(x \Mq,t{) associated to transitions
T; Sq is a set of sequences 5t- of of transitions that fire immediately after an
exponential firing of t^T; B is the set of binary transition vectors Bi defined for
each ij-eT; Cv is the set of coverage constants c,- associated with each t,eT.

2.3.2. MSPN Construction
Given a processor array and a reconfiguration scheme, an informal procedure
to construct the corresponding MSPN is as follows:

Procedure MSPN
Inputs:
Array size;
Initial configuration Cq = (??i % * ' ' Vk)i
Set of rules that determine the actions of the reconfiguration algorithm in
response to faults; i.e., a rule r,-; specifies the type and number of components
added or subtracted if a component type i fails in an operational
configuration Cp,
Coverage factors for the failures of both active and non-active components;
Tables of probabilities of reconfiguration for each non-active component
type. (For each different non-active component type, a probability of
successful reconfiguration is conditioned by the number of faults of each
type; the probability of configuration is then the product of these conditional
probabilities).
Output: MSPN representation: (P, T, A, M, Pr, Sq, B, Cv)
Begin
Step 1:
Assign a place p,- and a transition i,- to component type i.
Step 2:
for each rule r,-; do
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Group the component types affected by the failure of component type i
into a set A* as the set of I/O places with respect to transition
Determine the multiplicity of each peA,- and let V,- be the set of
multiplicities associated with A,-.
end for
Step 8:
A

Group those transition t,- that: a) are fired by components which are all of
type active or all of type non-active b) have the same set of input and output
places c) have the same set of multiplicities and d) have same coverage
factor.
For each group i do
Define transition tj, sets At- and F,-.
Specify
Form the binary transition vector B{ such that a component b\ of J3t- is
one if the failure of a component type 1 can fire and zero otherwise.
end for
end procedure

As pointed out previously a discrete probability distribution is associated
with each transition such that a number of faulty spare components present in
the current configuration is taken into account when the firing occurs. These
probabilities are estimated using simulation or by closed form expressions.

2.4. Reachability Graph
In this section the generation of the reachability graph is discussed. A
mapping from the transitions in the MSPN to the transitions between states in
the corresponding Markov model is established. An implementation procedure to
generate the reachability graph is also described.
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2.4.1. Probability Transition Vectors
For each marking MqjtR generated when i,- fires (as stated previously R is
the set of markings that can be directly generated from the same marking Mq), Btand the distribution function P(x \ Mq,ti) defined previously can be used to
generate vectors of the form:
Pr'qjBi = [prx • • • prk\
where pn — Prqj if 6/ = 1 and pr\ = 0 if 6/ = 0. These vectors are referred to as
the Probability Transition Vectors (PTV’s). The use of PTV’s is illustrated in
Fig. 2.4; assuming y=l,2,..., | R \ identifies the markings that can be directly
generated from the same marking Mq, then

\R\

■

Prq}- — 1. In the event that two

1=1
or more non-distinct new markings are generated from the same marking, a
merging to a single new marking is carried out by a vector addition of the
corresponding probability transition vectors.

Figure 2.4.- Marking Generation with Pr‘qj

Example 2.2: Analyzing a particular marking (in a 4X4 array with a MSPN
as in Figure 2.3) say M18 r- [12 24 20 4 9 11], then if tl fires (i.e. either a PE, a
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IOL or a HL failed) the marking M^o = [8 16 20 8 6 7] results with
Pr}8)3o = 0.667. Thus, a PTV is given by Pr}8)30JBi = [0.667 0.667 0 0 0.667 0].
However the array may fail with Pr\Q j = 0.333 due to the existence of one faulty
SBL (#PE’s - #SBL’s — 12 - 11 — 1). Thus, a PTV is given by
PrlsjBi = [0-333 0.333 0 0 0.333 0]
When t2 fires (i.e a S' or a BL failed), the array fails with probability Prfgy = 1,
the corresponding PTV is given by: Prl8jB2 =[00 1 1 0 0]. Therefore, the
overall PTV associated with the transition to the failure marking when t\ or t2
fires is obtained as follows: Pr\8jBi + Pr\&jB2 = [0.333 0.333 1 1 0.333 0]. The
probability of survival is obtained by applying equation (3.9) derived in chapter 3.
□.

2.4.2. Failure Rate Condition
Any transition in the MSPN can fire on every possible marking that
represents an operational configuration. However, if all components whose failures
fire a particular transition never fail, that transition will never fire. In the process
of generating the reachability graph, a flag st- signals this condition for each
transition i,-. Let a be a vector with components a; where each cq is the failure
rate of the component type l and a;,- = B^. The flag s,- is set to one if a,- > 0 and
zero otherwise.

2.4.3. Derivation of Transition Rates
Let (X(t), f >0} denote a continuous time homogeneous Markov process on a
finite state space S ^ {l,2, * • • ,s) and denote the state probability vector at
time t by P(t) — [Pi(<), P2(0> ' ‘ * > Ps(t)], where Pi(t) = P{X{t)=i}, ieS. The
process is characterized by the following set of Chapman-Kolmogorov differential
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equations:
dPAt)

, ,

■

I, " = XIaijPi{t) ~~ aj}Pj{t)
al
i

where a,-y are the transition rates from previous states i and ayy = Yjajh "where ay*
k
are transitions rates from state j to states k.

The solution for the set of

differential equations is given in matrix form as follows:
P(t) = P(0)eAt
where A is the transition rate matrix with elements a,y and P(0) — (1,0, • * • ,0)f
is the initial vector state. Assuming there is only one absorbing state (i.e., failure
state) and indexing transient (operational) states by l,...,s—1, then the reliability
S

of the system is given by: R (t) —

Pi{i)

The transition rates a,y can be expressed in terms of the attributes associated
with the transitions in the MSPN, i.e., aqx = f (P{x \
Denote by a a diagonal transition rate matrix with elements ay,- = ay and
a

atj-y = 0 for i=£j (a,- is the failure rate of the ith component). Let Mq — Mqa where
Mq = [mlg, m2g, * • • ra^q] denotes as before, a particular marking q, then
Qqi — fy^,CjPrq\bj) b,eBi,j=l,...,k]Mg
i

(2.1)

defines the transition rate from state q to an operational state /. The summation
is defined over all transitions that fire exponentially and generate the same
marking l. It is interesting to notice the relationship of equation (2.1) with the
-

T

firing rate of a particular transition <,• given by the vector product B(Mq . A
transition to the failure state occurs for lack of support (i.e., enough spares) or
lack of coverage. In the first case, lack of support occurs if the reconfiguration
algorithm failed due to exhaustion of spare components or the fact that the array
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fails to reconfigure if a given distribution of faults is not supported by tbe
reconfiguration algorithm. Denote by

the transition to the failure state (f) for

lack of support, then
•

'A

' '

'

X<jf = fy)Prqfbji

Let \cqf be the transition to / for lack of coverage then:

/

»

The overall transition rate to the failure state is:
Kf = V + ^9/
The diagonal term of the matrix A is calculated as follows:
aqg=~( E aql + ^gf) = _(EV + V)

where:

i

Example 2.8: Consider a particular marking say Mjg = [12 24 20 4 9 11], then
with the following failure rates: aQ = 1, ax = a2 == * * *

= .01, yield

M18 = [12 .24 .20 .04 .09 ,11]. As in example 2.2, the following probabilities are
used: Prig,30 = 0.667, Pr\8j = 0.333, Prf8j — 1. Let cx — c2 = c then, when tx
fires the following transition rates in the Markov chain are generated:
*

T

ais,f = c[.667 .667 0 0 .667 0]M18 = 8.2241c. The transition to the failure state
due to lack of support when t\ and i2 fire is
X18)/ = ([.333 .333 0 0 .333 0]+[0 0 11 0 0]J.M18 = 4.34589. For lack of coverage
A
X^ = (1—c)[.667 .667 0 0 .667 0]M4 = 8.2241(1—c). The overall transition rate
to the failure state is given as X18y = 8.2241 *(1—c) + 4.34589. Considering that a

failure of a SBL (£0) yields a transition rate a18ig = [00000 1]M18

0.11 then

the diagonal term is calculated as: a j8 i8 = 8.2241+.11+4.34589 — 12.68. □

2.4.4. Implementation Procedure
The implementation procedure MODELGEN outlined below merges repeated
markings as they are being generated and calculates or modifies the transition
rates in the process. The new markings generated every iteration, are targets of
the currently visited marking; they are inserted into a linked list of markings. As
they are generated, markings are sorted with respect to the sum of those
components indicated by the user through comparison flags previously set. An
array of pointers to the newly created targets is updated. A pointer to the current
marking is denoted by cm. A pointer to the next marking in the list is referred to
by next A systematic indexing of markings is carried out such that the resulting
transition rate matrix is always upper triangular; a marking number is assigned
to every next marking fetched from the sorted list; a pointer nxtopr points to
markings Which are candidates to be printed or saved in a file. If all its targets
have been numbered, then a marking is saved or printed out; therefore, no
significant amount of memory is required to generate large models.

The

procedure stops when all markings have been fetched from the sorted list. Notice
that the linked list corresponds to the reachability graph and as it is forme(d, both
the transition rate

matrix representation of the Markov model and the

reachability graph are printed out or saved as requested by the user.

Procedure MODELGEN -

Inputs: Set of failure rates (a,); File names (to save the matrix representation
of the Markov model); An MSPN representation of the reconfiguration
algorithm (Procedure MSPN outlined previously).
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Outputs: Reachability graph description; Matrix representation of the
Markov model.
Begin
Set a coverage flag for each transition that it is fired by non-active
components, (this allows the evaluation of a symbolic matrix for different
coverage values).
Set comparison flags (to select those components by which the list of
markings is sorted).
Load initial marking
for each t,-let s,-=
Let cm point to initial marking
nxtopr — cm
while not end of list do
fetch current marking
assign a number to current marking
for each £,• and if st- > 0 do
get P(x | Mq,ti)
fire ti and those transitions fye5,calculate transition rates
store targets in temporary table
end for
merge repeated targets
insert new targets in sorted list
insert pointers to new targets in current marking
while all targets of nxtopr are numbered do
output nxtopr marking
let nxtopr = nxtopr^-next
end while
let cm = cm—>next
end while
end procedure
The execution time of MODELGEN is proportional to the number of states
generated and therefore depends on the reconfiguration algorithm. For the cases
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given in Table 3.2 in chapter 3 the execution time is 0(n3) for nXn processor
arrays.

2.5. Summary
A systematic procedure to construct Markov models was discussed in this
chapter.

Using an SPN-like representation, transition firing represents the

occurrence of faults; A place contains a number of tokens tokens which
correspond to the number of components of a single type; thus, the collection of
different components is represented by a marking in an SPN-like representation
and a marking corresponds to an operational configuration of the array. However
an SPN-like representation fails to take into account the distribution of faulty
spares that exist when reconfiguration takes place and may cause the array to
fail. Also the fact that several component types causes the same effect in the
array when it reconfigures, leads to a more compact representation of the array
which is referred to as an MSP N representation.
A mapping from transitions and markings in an MSPN representation to
transitions and states in the Markov model was derived. This mapping allows the
construction of the corresponding Markov model as the generation of the
reachability graph is taking place.
The more the detail (number of components or places in the MSPN
representation) that is included in the model the larger is the state space in the
resulting Markov model. In summary the application of this method entails two
interrelated problems. In the first place a thorough analysis of the array is
required such that all interdependencies of failures of different components are
defined; this can be a difficult task for complex reconfiguration schemes; secondly,
in some applications a detailed modeling may be limited to small size arrays
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because of the large number of states generated. Finally, considering the fact that
reconfiguration algorithms are primarily designed to treat failures of PE’s
elements only, an MSPN representation for a given reconfiguration scheme, will
depend on the assumptions made as to how the algorithm treats failures on
component types other than PE’s.
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CHAPTER m
MSPN APPLICATIONS

3.1. Introduction
In this chapter three reconfiguration schemes are analyzed in detail.
Algorithms to calculate probabilities of reconfiguration are derived. As stated in
the previous chapter, probability functions P(x |

are associated with each

transition i,- in the MSPN; probabilities of reconfiguration are used to determine
Probability Transition Vectors which are in turn used to calculate transition rates
in the Markov model. The probability of survival corresponds to the sum of
probabilities of reconfiguration if the new markings generated are all operational;
i.e. if the new markings correspond to operational configurations. In the second
section of this chapter two algorithms are derived to calculate probabilities of
reconfiguration for the SRE scheme. The third and fourth sections deal in detail
with the ARCE and DR reconfiguration schemes, respectively. Expressions to
determine the number of states for each reconfiguration scheme are given in
section five. Also, in this section, results of the reliability analysis of each scheme
are reported.
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3.2. SRE Reconfiguration Scheme
In chapter 2, the basic concepts underlining MSPN’s representations of fault
tolerant processor arrays were thoroughly discussed. Concurrently and for the
purpose of illustration, the SRE reconfiguration scheme was analyzed. Hence, in
this section, expressions to estimate probabilities of reconfiguration for this
scheme are derived.
The process of generating the reachability graph which describes the
corresponding Markov model of an SRE scheme, starts with an initial marking
given as follows:
p1:#PE = n2
p2:#IOL=2n2
P3: #S = n+n2
=0

Pa-.

p5: f-IIL = n(n-l)
p6:#SBL = n2
A failure marking corresponds to the case when $PE=0 or $SBL<i0.
Transition tl will take place if either alf a2 or a5 is greater than zero; t2 will
take place if either a3 or a4 is greater than zero. Likewise, t3 takes place if

a5>0.

3.2.1. Probability Transition Vectors in SRE
To derive PTV’s, estimations of probabilities of reconfiguration are required
for each reconfiguration scheme. In the SRE case, its MSPN indicates (Fig. 3)
that when tx fires, two transitions in the Markov model may occur (corresponding
to a sequence of two firings in the MSPN: t\ followed by t2)] one with probability

Pr\j which corresponds to the probability of survival denoted by Ps. The other
transition fires immediately and will lead the processor array to a failure state
with probability Pr\f. The array will survive with probability Ps if the failure of a
PE or an IOL that triggers the reconfiguration algorithm occurs in a row that
contains no faulty SBL. Let N denote the number of faulty SBL in a marking Mq
then N is determined by:
N = #PEq - #SBLq = mlq - m6f
where 0 < N < nX.ii.
To estimate Ps, it is necessary to find all the possible ways in which N faulty
SBL’s can be mapped into a total of rXc SBL’s in the array with a current
configuration containing r rows and c columns. To simplify this problem we count
all the possible partitions of N into r parts with a value not greater than c
columns. Because each row contains c SBL’s, up to c faulty SBL’s per row are
possible.
Each partition of Nis a k-tuple (ai,o2, . . . , a*), such that:
N = Oij +
where: c>a,->c,+i>l for

"b ••• "b

(3-1)

1 and

In [Ber8l] it is shown that the number of partitions of N with k or less parts
and AT>a,>a,+1>l, is given by the recurrence relations:
F(N-k,k)=F{N,l) + F(N,2)+ ... +F{N,k)

(3.2)

F(N, 1) = F{N,N) = 1
The function F(N,k) is interpreted as the number of partitions of N with k
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Theorem 1: Let us denote by F(N) the number of wanted partitions of TV;
i.e. those partitions with at least one part a,- > c are excluded. Then F(N) is
given by:
F{N)=F{N,c,l)+ ... +F(N,c,r)

(3.3)

where:
0
F{N,c,k)

if N>kc
■Jj F(N—l,l,k—l)

otherwise

(3.4)

'-M
and
F{N, c, 1) = F{N,c,N) = 1 if JV < c

(3.5)

F{N,c,k)

(3.6)

=0

if k> N

Proof: Let us consider first the case when N > kc. Each term in the summation
is recursively decomposed until the functions generated satisfy equations (3.5) and
(3.6). The value of / in each term of the summation corresponds to a part a,- in
the ith iteration. The partitions generated will contain a part a,- such that
< a,i < c. Hence, if N/k > c implies all partitions will have at least the
first part aj >c and F(N,c,k) = 0 follows.
Let us examine now the case when N < ck. F(N,c,k) is decomposed into
+1) functions, which in turn are recursively decomposed until the
cases of equations (3.5) or (3.6) are reached. In the process those functions in
which N > kc or k > N are eliminated.
The number of terms in the sum corresponds to all the possible values a part may
take and since the minimum at every iteration is a, = jiV/kj, we let ax < c as an
upper bound for the first iteration which gives the number of summands
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indicated previously. For the next iteration the process is repeated. At the ith
iteration, N = N—a{ and k has been decremented to indicate that now the new
value of N is to be partitioned in A;—* parts such
Equations (3.3-S.6) can also be used to determine the value of each part in a
particular partition since in the ith iteration the index l in equation (3.4)
corresponds to the value of a,- whereas N—l c<

>

be partitioned among the k—1 remaining part
Example S.l: To illustrate the application of the above relations, let us find
all the possible distributions of 8 faulty SBL’s in a 4X4 array (r=c=n).
Solution: With N = 8, n — 4 and r = 4 we have:
F(8) = F(8,4,l) + F(8,4,2) + F(8,4,3) + F(8,4,4)
F (8,4,1) = 0 since 8 >4
F(8,4,2)=F(4,4,1) = 1
F(8,4,3)=F(5,3,2)+F(4,4,2)
= F(2,3,l) +F(2,2,1) +F(1,3,1) + F (0,4,1) = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3
F(8,4,4) = F(6,2,3) + F(5,3,3) + F(4,4,3)
=>(4,2,2).+ F (3,2,2) +> (2,3,2) + F(2,2,2) +F(l,3,2) +F(0,4,2)
= F (2,2,1) + F (1,2,1) + F (1,1,1) +F (1,1,1) +0+0=4
And F(8) = 0 + 1+3+ 4= 8
Table 3.1, shows the order of the resulting partitions, where partition 1) is
given by F(8,4,2); partitions 2-4 are given by F(8,4,3); and partitions 5-8 are given
by F(8,4,4). □
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Table 3.1. Partitions of N = 8
Partition
No.
1
2
3
4
5 .
6
7
8

av
4
3
4
4
2
3
3
4

Parts
CL 9 a, %
0
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
2
2
3
1
1
2

04.'
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
1

The probability of survival Ps can be found by two methods using in both
cases the Total Probability Theorem [Tri82]. In the first method:
F(N)
P8 = ^P{s\t)P{t)

(3.7)

t=l

The term P(s | i) is the probability of success given the ith partition occurs and
P(») is the probability that the ith partition occurs. These probabilities are
obtained as follows:

p(5io

= 4 >(o = f
r—1

where Z{ is the number of zeros in the ith partition, 7T,- =

• *

Tr

n

t=0

corresponds to the number of mappings represented by the ith partition with m

distinct parts repeated 77 (l</<ra) times. The term

tt

=

F(N)
1=1

rc
7Tf*' = N is the total
\ /

number of possible mappings of N faulty SBL’s into an array with rXc number of
PE’s. After some manipulations on equation (3.7), the following expression
results:
1 HP)
PS = ---- £ Zi'Ki
■
r 7r 1=1

(3.S)

35

A drawback in this procedure is that an enumeration of the possible partitions of
N is required and this is a lengthy task for large processor arrays. A second
method more attractive for large arrays is given in the following:
Theorem 8.2: Denote by k the number of rows (number of parts in the partition)
with » faults (k parts with same value i), let 7r be defined as above and let #(&,*)
be the total number of mappings with exactly k rows with i faults then the
probability of survival is given by the following expression:
Ps

m

6(k, i)

*=1

7r

= E

(3.9)

where
/
\ / \
r
c
(r-j)c
= £H0y+* 3
k 3 N-ij i
< ■>
\

where 0 < t < c and m is determined such that 0 < N—im < (r— m)c.
Proof: To find 9(k, i), denote by A* the number of mappings with at least k rows
with * faults, then
\
j

1

r
Ak = k

<

N-ik

c
i

> ^ >

The first binomial corresponds to the number of ways k is combined in r rows; the
second binomial gives the number of mappings of the remaining faults into the
remaining spots (PE’s) in the array; the last binomial corresponds to the number
of ways in which i faults are mapped into c PE’s in one column in each of the k
rows. Because

counts also A/ for 4</<m by a factor of

obtained subtracting all mappings with l rows; i.e.:
6{k,i)=Ak-

S
/=*+1

9(1,i)

6(k, i)

can be
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By letting 6(m,i) = Am an expression of 8(k, *) is obtained recursively in terms of
A*. After substituting A* the expression for 6{k, i) given above follows.
To obtain Ps, let a*jt- be the set of partitions with k rows with i faults then the
probability of survival given a^i is k/r and using the Total Probability Theorem
the probability of survival is given by:
m
Ps=P(s)=YlP(s\akii)P(akii)
k=1

where P(a*t) = ^ —- and equation (3.9) follows. □
In the particular case of the SRE scheme, Ps is obtained by letting i=0 in
equation (3.9).

3.3. ARCE Reconfiguration Scheme
In the ARCE scheme, a row elimination is followed by a column elimination
[FoR85]. Figure 3.1, shows a section of an nXn array supporting ARCE. Since the
number of rows and columns varies with each configuration, then at a given
configuration, r denotes the number of rows and c the number of columns. The
array is in a r-configuration (r=c) if the reconfiguration algorithm deletes a row;
Likewise, it is in a c-configuration (r < c) if the reconfiguration algorithm deletes
a column; In Figure 3.1, the following components are identified: PE’s; I/O
Links, which are the interconnections between switches and PE’s; Column
Switches (CS), which are the switches in the current c columns of the array; Row
Switches (RS), these are the switches in the current r rows of the array. The spare
bypass links (SBL) used to bypass a faulty row become active links and are
referred to as Row Bypass Links (RBL’s). Likewise, the spare bypass links used
to bypass a faulty column become active links and are referred to as Column
Bypass Links (CBL’s).

In the case of ARCE, the following assumptions are made:
1)

The failure of a PE or an IOL, causes the elimination of a row if the array is
in a r-configuration; it causes the elimination of a column if it is in a cconfiguration.

2)

All switches in the current configuration are considered active.

3)

The failure of a RS in a r-configuration, causes the elimination of that row;
in a c-configuration, a column is eliminated followed by the affected row to
comply with the alternate column-row deletion process.

4)

The failure of a CS in a c-configuration, causes the deletion of the affected
column; in a r-configuration a row and the affected column are eliminated.

5)

The failure of a RBL, causes the same effect as the failure of a RS.

6)

The failure of a CBL, causes the same effect as the failure of a CS.

7)

If a row is deleted, the spare bypass links used to bypass that row must be
fault free. Otherwise, the row is deleted followed by the column deletion with
the faulty spare link; this sequence is referred to as a row-column deletion
sequence. Likewise, if a column is deleted the spare bypass links used to
bypass that column must be fault free; otherwise, the column is deleted
followed by the row with the faulty spare link; this sequence is referred to as
column-row deletion sequence.

3.3.1. MSPN Representation of the ARCE Scheme
Any operational configuration Ct- for the ARCE scheme is described as
follows:
Vi = (vu,V2i,

V7i) - {#PE,#IOL,#C5,#RS,#RBL, f-CDL,#SBL)

An operational configuration Ct- corresponds to an operational marking M,-.
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(cs

Figure 3.1.- Schematic Layout of the ARCE Structure

An initial configuration C0 in terms of the size n of the array, is given by the
following set of equations:
p1:#PE = n2,
p2: #IOL = An2,
Pz‘ HRS = (n+l)w,
Pa'

#<7S = (n+l)n,

p5: #RBL = 0,
p6: #CBL =0,
p7: jjSBL = 2n2.
In any configuration <7,- described by a marking M,-, the number of rows r
and columns c are calculated as follows:
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r

(mi.)

The difference d = c — r — 0 identifies r-configurations and d — 1 identifies
c-configurations.
'A transition to a failure marking occurs if the current marking contains not
enough PE’s or not enough SBL’s. To identify this condition in each marking Mq,
a flag x is set or reset accordingly:
x =i

1

if m{>m and m6>2m

0

otherwise

where m and 2m refer to the number of PE’s and SBL’s, respectively, eliminated
by the reconfiguration scheme. Notice that m takes values depending on the type
of the current configuration.
A place Pi and a transition £,• is assigned to each component type as listed
above. For each f,- the corresponding set A,- of I/O places and set of multiplicities
V{ are determined next.
According to assumption l),

(failure of a PE) affects all the components in

a column or a row; hence:
^1 = {/(<lj*0(|i)}. = {{Pl,P2»P3>P4,P5>P6,P7}>{P6>P7}}

The set Vi of variable multiplicities is given by the following set of
equations:
a)

n[ = rx+mlq(l—x)

b) jxl = 4rx+m2g(l—a:)
c) ni = {n+l)dx+mZq{l—x)
d)

p,{ = (n+l)(l — d)x+m4g(l—x)
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e)

p{ = (n—r)dx+m5q(l—x)

f)

vl■— (»— c)(l — d)x+m6g(l—x)

g)

p\ = 2rx+m7q(l-x)

h)

p° = r(l-d)x-m5q(l-x)

i)

P° = rdx—m6q(l—x)

This set of equations indicate that when fq fires then: a) r PE’s are deleted;
b) 4 IOL’s for each PE eliminated are also eliminated; c) in a c-configuration,
n+1 CS’s are deleted; d) in a r-configuration n+1 RS’s are deleted; e) n—r RBL’s
are deleted in a r-configuration; this number corresponds to the RBL’s bypassing
the PE’s in the rows already eliminated; however, no RBL’s are deleted if the
current configuration is a c-configuration; f) no CBL’s are deleted in a cconfiguration but in a r-configuration, n—c CBL’s need to be deleted which are
those CBL’s bypassing PE’s in the columns already eliminated; g) since there are
two SBL’s for each PE, 2r SBL’s are deleted in either configuration; h) the
number of RBL added corresponds to the number of PE’s in a deleted row; i) the
number of CBL’s added corresponds to the number of PE’s in a deleted column.
The failure of an IOL (f2)> as stated in assumption l) causes the same effect
as fj. Therefore A % — A i and V2 — Flv
The failure of a CS (t3) as stated in assumption 4), will have the following
set A3:
A3={l{i3),0(i3)} = {{p1,p2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7},{P5,P<i}}

Let m=r+(c—l)(l—d) then the set V3 of variable multiplicities is given as
follows:
a)

p[ = mx+mlq(l—x)
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b)

*4 — 4fnx+m2?(l-s)

c)

Pz = (n+l)x+W3?(l—x\

d)

pi = (n-t-l)(l—d)x+m4q(l- x)

e)

P5 =" (n-r)i+m5!(l-i)

D

pi = (n—c)(l—d)a:-|-m6?(l- x)

g)

P'7 = 2mx-\-m-jq{l—x)

b)
0

= (c —1)(1—d)x—m5g(l--x)
p6 — (r+d—l)x—m6q(l—x)

Thus when t3 fires, equation a) shows that in a c-configuration, only r PE’s
are eliminated; however in a row configuration, to delete a column a row must be
deleted first giving a total of r+(c—1) PE’s eliminated. In general given a rconfiguration, to delete a column, the sequence row-column deletion applies and
given a c-configuration, to delete a row, the sequence column-row deletion applies.
In equation b), for every PE that is eliminated 4 IOL’s are also eliminated. In c)
shows that in either configuration, all the OS’s in the affected column are
eliminated. Equation d) shows that in a r-configuration all the RS’s in the affected
row are eliminated. Equation e) indicates that in either configuration (n — r)
RBL’s are eliminated. Equation f) shows that in a c-configuration, n—c is the
number of rows that have been eliminated, so the same number of active CBL’s is
eliminated. However none are eliminated if a column is deleted. Equation g)
deletes 2 SBL’s for each PE deleted. Equation h) shows that in a c-configuration
the row-column sequence activates only c—1 RBL’s; none is activated in a rconfiguration. Equations) shows that r—1 CBL’s are activated corresponding to
the column deleted in a row-column sequence that applies in a c-configuration; in
a r-configuration only a column is eliminated and so are the r CBL’s in it.
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The effect of the failure of a RS (t4), as stated in assumption 3), is described
by the following set A4:
A4={l{i4),0(t4)} = {{p1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6,P7},{PS’P&}}

with the following set of variable multiplicities V4 where m—r+(c—i)d:
a)

,u{ — mx+mlq(l—x)

b)

(ii2 = 4mi+m2g(l-i)

c)

(n+l)dx+m3q(l—x)

d)

/4 — {n+l)x+m4q(l—x)

e)

/4 = (n—r)dx+m5q(l—x)

f)

(Ug = (n—c)x+meq(l—x)

g)

fly = 2mx+m,Tq(l—x)

h)

/if = mx—mSq(l—x)

i)

P'6 = {r~ l)dx—m6?(l—x)

These equations are essentially the same as for t^, except that in case of a cconfiguration, the failure of a RS, implies the deletion of the affected row
therefore the sequence column-row deletion applies. Note that equation h) shows
that the number of CBL’s activated corresponds to the number of PE’s
eliminated in a c-configuration; i.e. c CBL’s; in the case of a r-configuration
r=c— 1 CBL’s are activated.

Likewise, the number of RBL’s activated by

equation i), corresponds to the number of PE’s eliminated in a r-configuration;
none in a c-configuration.
The failure of a RBL (t5) as stated in assumption 6), will have the same
effect as the failure of CS; therefore A5 = A3 and V5 = V3.
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The failure of a CBL (i6), has the same effect as the failure of a RS;
therefore Ag —A4 and Fg = F4.
The failure of a SBL (£7), will decrease the number of SBL’s by one and:
A7 = {/(<7),0(f7)} = {{p7 }> {0}}
With a set V7 of variable multiplicities as follows:
'

Vi = 1

Transitions

and i2 have same set of I/O places and same set of
$

multiplicities; therefore transition ti of the MSPN is defined with A1 = Aj = A2
and V{ = F4 = F2.
Likewise tz and f5 define transition i2 °f the MSPN with A2 = A3 = A5
and F2 — F3 — F5.
Transitions f4 and i6 define transition i3 of the MSPN with A3 = A4 = A6
and F3 = F4 = F6.
Finally transition i7 define i4 with A4 = A7 and F4 = V7.
The set of transitions t thus obtained with the corresponding sets of I/O
places and variable multiplicities describe the MSPN of the ARCE scheme shown
in Figure 3.2.
The transition vectors associated with the transitions t are the following:
Bx = [1 1 0 0 0 0 0]
B2 = [0010 100]
Bz = [000 1 0 1 0]
£4 = [000000 1]

Notice that in ARCE, t7 will not occur if

= a2 = 0, t2 will not occur if

a3 == a5 = 0, t3 will not occur if pr4 — o;6 = 0 and t± will not occur if a7 = 0.

3.3.2. Probability Transition Vectors in ARCE
In ARCE, a successful reconfiguration takes place if 1) In a r-configuration
(r=c), all r RBL’s in the row to be deleted are fault free and 2) in a cconfiguration (r<c), all r CBL’s, in the column to be deleted are fault free.
In either case we are interested in the distribution of Nx faulty spare RBL’s
and N2 faulty spare CBL’s, such that N = Nt + N2 is the total number of faulty
spare links where 0 <ATX <rc, 0 <N2 < rc. In a marking q, the number N of
faulty SBL’s is obtained as follows:
N = 2 mlq—m7q
where mlq = rc and 0 <N< 2rc. The number of SBL’s that must be fault free
for a successful reconfiguration is always r. Let H(N) be the number of partitions
of Ninto parts ATX and N2 such that 0<NuN2<rc, then
_fiV+l N<rc
II{N) — |2rc_(jv—1) N>rc
Assuming all possible partitions of N are equally likely, the probability that any
nth partition will occur is pr(n) = l/H(N).
Let X be a random variable which denotes the number of faulty sbl s
(column spares in case of a r-configuration and row spares bypass links in case of
c-configuration). Then Pr{X=i \ h) is the probability that there are i faulty
spare links in the row or column to be deleted given the nth partition occurs; this
probability is given by equation (3.9).
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The total probability Pr(X=»), which corresponds to the probability that * spare
row/column links are faulty in the row/column to be deleted out of a total of N
faulty spare links is given by:
H(N)

,

i

Pr{X=t) = S Pr(X=i \ n)pr(n) =
n=1

1

H(N) m k Q(k, 0
EE r
7T
/

H(N)

,

E Pr(X=i | n)
H[N)
»=1
(3.1°)

Since 0<? <r, expression (3.10) implies that there will be at most r+1
transitions from a given state to up to r+1 different new states. Each transition
r
is weighted by Pr(X—i) such that
Pr(X=i) = 1. Every term in this
x=0

summation corresponds to a transition probability as stated previously. The size
of the set R of states directly reachable from any given state is for this case up to
r+1 and includes the failure state if X=r.
Because every possible value of X, may trigger a different reconfiguration the
following cases are observed:
1) Case of transition t^.- If t=0, a row or column is deleted in a c or r-

configuration respectively. However if *X), i sequences of rc-deletions are
required: in a r-COnfiguration i faulty spare row bypass links become faulty active
row bypass links so £2 is applied i times; In a c-configuration i faulty spare
column bypass links become faulty active column bypass links so £3 is applied i
times.
2) Case of transition t2- The application of t2 implies rc-deletions in a r-

configuration for all i. In a c-configuration however, if *=0, only the column
affected is deleted; if i>0, then i rc-deletions occur and since the column spare
bypass links in the columns deleted become active column bypass links then £3 is
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applied i times.
3) Case of transition t3- In this case, t rc-deletions are required in a c-

rnnfiguration. However in a r-configuration, if i=0, only the affected row is
deleted, otherwise i rc-deletions are necessary and since the faulty spare row
bypass links become active row bypass links,

12

is applied i times.

In summary, to capture these cases in an MSPN representation the sequences
Si, $2 &nd S3 are defined as follows:
Si — S2
i.e., whenever

_ ((<2, * * * » *2)' if d = 0
• • • , t3) otherwise

S3

t2 or t3 fire exponentially, a sequence of r immediate firings of

t2 or t3 will follow depending whether the current marking corresponds to a rconfiguration or a c-configuration.
Finally, we adopt the following criteria to determine the number of faulty
spares that are passed on to the new configuration. When a single row or column
is eliminated, the number of faulty spares passed on to the new configuration is
given by:
Ni = N0 - r
In general after k firings of a sequence 5,- have occurred, the following recursion
can be applied:
Nk =

-m

where
r
m

— ■

for ti

r+(c—l)d
for t2
r+(c—l)(l—d) for t3
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These expressions assure that the spares that become active and make the
new configuration possible must be fault-free. The number of faults in a current
configuration are distributed in the array between the rows and columns deleted
and the new configuration. Therefore the new configuration will contain nonfaulty spares if Nk < 0 otherwise iV* faulty spares are passed on to the new
configuration. To represent this condition every time

t% or

fires, let a flag y

be set or reset as follows:
1 if Nk <0
y =i
V0 otherwise

then the desired number of SBL’s (m7y) in a new marking j is obtained by
modifying the input multiplicities associated with SBL’s as follows:
/U7 = ((2m — Nk-i)y — m(l—y))x+m7(l—x)

3.4. Direct Reconfiguration Scheme
In this section an specific case of reconfigurable processor arrays that follow a
systematic chained replacement of faulty cells [SaS86a,SaS86b] is analyzed. Figure
3.3 shows a schematic layout of the hardware requirements for the Direct
Reconfiguration in an nXn array where interconnections are implemented through
multiplexers. For illustration, the Direct Reconfiguration (DR) algorithm is
emphasized, since other schemes within this class (fixed fault-stealing, variable
fault-stealing, complex fault-stealing, etc.,) [SaS86a,SaS86b] can be analyzed in a
similar way.
Upon the application of the reconfiguration algorithm (which considers the
total number of non-faulty cells), a faulty cell is replaced by a spare cell by
simply reindexing non-faulty cells and bypassing the faulty one. Thus, a shift of

functional cells or chained replacement is carried out when a faulty cell is
detected. For the case of a single spare row and a single spare column, the
reconfiguration algorithm scans each column of the array upwards and marks the
first faulty cell as a vertical fault. All other faults are classified as horizontal
faults. If one row has more than one horizontal faulty, reconfiguration is not
possible along that row and the reconfiguration fails.
To analyze the DR scheme, the following components are considered: active
cells (PE’s); I/O links (IOL’s); for each cell there are two Input Multiplexers
(IMX’s); for each cell there is one Output Multiplexer (OMX); Bypass Links (BL’s)
are active links which are used to bypass faulty cells; the Interconnection Links
(IL’s) are sets of links that define the interconnection network and it is assumed
(to simplify the analysis) that there is one set per column and that the
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corresponding failure statistics can be provided; spare cells (SPE’s); Spare IOL’s
(SIOL’s); Spare Multiplexers (SMX’s) which are the non-active multiplexers
associated with spare cells; Spare Bypass Links (SBL’s) are non-active bypass
links. ■
In the analysis of this scheme the following assumptions are made:
1)

The reconfiguration algorithm is applied to replace either spare or nominal
faulty cells. In this analysis only one spare row and one spare column are
assumed.

2)

A cell is bypassed by any one of the spare bypass links shown in the diagram
depending weather the reconfiguration is vertical or horizontal [SaS86a].
Since the functions of the bypassed cell are replaced by another cell, a link in
the IL is activated acting as a bypass. Therefore, it can be assumed that
always two bypass links will be used to bypass a faulty cell. Also, for a
successful reconfiguration both spare bypass links must be fault-free.

3)

The failure of an IL or an OMX or a BL is fatal.

5)

The failure of an SMX or an SIOL disables the spare cell to which they are
attached.

4)

The failure of an IMX or an IOL disables the cell to which they are attached.

3.4.1. MSPN of the DR Scheme
The following set of equations shows the initial configuration of an nXn
array that supports the DR scheme with one spare row and one spare column. A
place assigned to each component type is also indicated:
Pl: #PE = n2

..

Figure 3.3.- Schematic Layout of the DR Structure

p2: ftlOL — 4n2
p3:#IMX = 2n2
p4: #OMr =:n2 '
Ps:#BL—2n
p6: #IL = ra+1
p7: #SPE = 2n+l
p8: #SIOL — 4 *(2rc+l)
p<,: #5MT — 3(2»-|-l)
Pio1

= 2ra2+2(n+l)

Note that in the initial configuration the number of BL’s is given by those
active links required to bypass both the spare row and the spare column. The
number of SMX’s correspond to those multiplexers attached to spare cells; since
they are not active a single place is assigned to them assuming all have the same
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failure rate; when a cell becomes active then its 3 SMX’s are separated into 2
IMX’s and 1 OMX. The total number of SBL’s is given by those existing in the
nominal array plus (n+1) in the spare row and (n+1) in the spare column.
To construct the MSPN, let us denote by

the failure of an SBL (t10) with

Ai — A10 = {{pio},0} and Vi = Fj0 which contains only the equation Hio — 1.
Next, according to assumption 5, the failure of SIOL (tg) or the failure of an
SMX (tg), cause the same effect as the failure of an SPE (t7); therefore these
three transitions define t2 with A2 = A7 = A8 = Ag — {{p7,Ps,p9,Pio}>{P5}}*
The set of multiplicities associated with the set I/O arcs is defined as:
V2 =V7 == F8 = Vg which contain the following equations:
M? =1

•

Ms =4
Mg =3 ...

.

■

.

M10 = 1 ...
=

1

By assumption 3, the failure of an IL (t6) or the failure of an OMX (£4) or
the failure of a BL (£5) will cause the array to fail. These transitions define t3 in
the MSPN with a set of I/O places A3 = A6
}>0}

and

a

set

of

multiplicities

Hi = mu,H2 = mi2i••vMio = m»'io}> 0 }

A4 = A5 — {{ pj,p2, • • • >Pio
V3 = V& = V4 = V5

—

• {{

any given ith marking.

Finally by assumption 4 the failure of a PE (t/), the failure of an IOL (t2)
and the failure of an IMX (t3) have the same effect on a given current
configuration of the array; therefore transition 14 of the MSPN with a set of I/O
places A4 = Ax = A2 = A3 = {{p7>P8,P9>Pio>P5}>{P5,Pio}}- The corresponding
set of multiplicities is

V4 = V\ = V2 = V3 which contain the following
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equations:
(4 =l;f4

= 4;/4 = 3;/4o = 2;^[ = l;^f = 2;//100 = l;/4o = 2;

The Binary Transition Vectors associated with the transitions obtained are
the following:
Bx =[0 00000000 1]
B2 = [0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0]
£3 = [0 0011100 0 0]

£4 =[1 1 1 0000000]

When

fires because a PE or a IOL or an IMX failed, the the array

reconfigures with a probability of survival Ps=Pljq or fails with probability 1—Ps.
To capture the transition to the failure state,

fires immediately after 14 fires

exponentially. Hence S4 = (£3). The remaining transitions do not cause any
immediate firing; therefore, Sx =S2=S3=0. The MSPN obtained for the DR
scheme is shown in Figure 3.4.
Notice that
a7 = as

=

cxg —

tx

0, t3

will not occur if a10 =0,
will not occur if

a4

t2

= a5 = o?6 = 0

will not occur

if

and 't4 will not occur if

&i = a2 = a3 = 0.

3.4.2. Probability Transition Vectors in DR
A successful reconfiguration in the DR scheme depends on the availability of
spare cells upon the failure of an active cell and the fault-free condition of the
spare bypass links which bypass the faulty cells. The number of faulty cells Ne
and the number of faulty SBL’s Ns at an ith configuration of an nXn array are
given by:
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OMX

SIOL)

SMX)

BL V

■ H

Figure 3.4.- MSPN of the DR Scheme

Nc = 2nq+q2—nii7
Ns =2n2+2(n+q)+2nq—mi5—mnQ
where q is the number of spare rows and columns, m,-7 = r]i7, m,-5 = rjis and
m,io = ??,10 are the number of spare cells, the number of active bypass links
(BL’s) and the number of spare bypass links (SBL’s) in any ith configuration
respectively.
A probability of transition Pr is one when ti, t% or ts fire. However when t4
fires the reconfiguration scheme is triggered and the array reconfigures with a
probability Ps == Pr\j or fails with probability 1—Ps = Pr^.

Let P(s \ Nc)

denote the conditional probability of success given Ne number of faulty cells and
let P(s | Ns) denote the conditional probability of success given Ns faulty SBL’s.
The probability of succeiss is then given by:
Ps=P{s\Nc)P{s\Ns)

(3.11)
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Thus, the presence of faulty SBL’s in the array affects the overall successful
reconfiguration rate. The conditional probabilities of success are derived in the
next paragraphs.

Estimation of P(s | iVc)
To derive the probability of successful reconfiguration given Ne faulty cells,
the following recursive expression given in [JaR88] is used. Starting from the
(<7+l)th row to the (»+?)th row of the array the probability that a fatal failure
occurs in the first j rows is given by:
P/U) =

Pti-iW-Pti-WtU)

0

for J>'r

otherwise

at the (n+g)th row the conditional probability is obtained by:
P{s \Nc) = l-Pf{n+q)

(3.12)

where Pg{j) is the probability that a first fatal failure occurs in the jth row.
Denote by Pa(i) the probability that a row has exactly i faulty cells then:

PM =

\

n+q S—(n+q)
Nc—i
i
j

s

Ne
where 5=(n+^)2 is the total number of cells in the array.
Let Pb{j) den°te the probability that a column has at least q faulty cells in
the first j —1 rows then this probability is obtained as follows:
J-1
k

p>U)=Ek=q

<

s-Kj-i)

>

N,-k
7---T

s

Nc
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Now let Pc(i,j) denote the probability that at least q-\-1 out of i columns
have q faults or more in the first j—1 rows then:
Pc(hJ) = E
l=q+1

mmi-PHii) i-i

The probability of first fatal failure in the jth row Pg(j) is obtained as
follows:
n+q
i-gU) - £
i=q+l.
The probabilities of survival given Nc for several array sizes are shown in
Figure 3.5. These results compare closely with those obtained using simulation as
reported in [SaS86a].

Estimation of P(e\N,)
To estimate the probability of success given N, faulty SBL’s, let us assume
that up to two SBL’s per active cell may be faulty. Denote by p a place where a
cell may have either none, one or two faulty SBL’s then the number of possible
faulty places denoted by JVp varies as follows:
N.
2 <NP<P
where /? =
N,

mm{N„2(n2-Ne)}.

The probability of successful reconfiguration given

is given by:
P.
E
P(s

|

N,) =

(3.13)
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/

n2 'n2-N'
Nc , N> ,
=--V\

the numerator of the above expression corresponds to the possible number of
mappings of both faulty cells and faulty SBL’s in which both types of faults do
not coincide in a single place. The numerator corresponds to the total possible
number of mappings (fault distributions) given Np and Ne.
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Let

P(Np)

be the probability that

Np

faulty places exist. This probability is

obtained as:

N.
W) =
s
k= Nr
2
By the Total Probability Theorem, the conditional probability given

N,

is

given by:
P{»

I

N.)

=

E

P(s

|

Np)P(Np)

(3.14)

N,

N>~ —
Finally, substituting and simplifying in the above expression yields (3.13).

3.5. Comparative Results
In this section expressions are derived to determine the state space of the
three schemes analyzed. The state space size can be obtained through these
expressions or through MODELGEN. Also some reliability results are reported
for several sets of failure rates to compare the effect of detailed modeling with
respect to an analysis in which only failure of PE’s are considered.

3.5.1. State Space
For the schemes analyzed, Table 3.2 shows the growth of the state space as
function of the size of the array. In this table all failure rates are assumed greater
than zero in order to generate in each case, the maximum number of states. The
maximum; number of states tabulated, can be obtained using for each case closed
form expressions.
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To derive the number of states for the SRE case, let £(n) denote the
maximum number of states for an nxn array; then:
sSKB{n) =

+ 2n)

This expression is derived by observing that

n

states are generated with non-

faulty SBL’s; for each state i with non-faulty SBL’s, »(»—»') additional states are
generated. Hence, the total number of states is obtained by solving the
n—1
summationSSRE{n) = [»(»—i)+l] to yield the above expression.
"

:

,

1=0

For the ARCE case the number of states S(ti) can be derived by observing
that

(2n—1)

states are generated with non-faulty SBL’s. Each of these states

generates additional states with a total number expressed by the following
summation:
2n—2
XJ.{[2(n-t)2+l] +• [2(n-0(n-i-l)+i]}'

• V

i=o

.

'

from which the following recursion is derived:
Sarce{1) = 3

^ARCBi71) — Sn-1 + 4n2 — 2 n + 2

with a closed form solution given by::
^ARCE{n) =

The number of states

+ 7fl) + 4] + 3

in the case of DR, can be obtained by the

following expression:

2qn+q2 '
■ ' . :SDR(n)=

Yj [(27i2+2(?n+g2)+l)-i]

i=0

In this expression the summation is carried out over all states generated with i
faulty SPE’s. Solving this summation the following closed form results:
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SDR(n) - {2qn+q2+l)[2n2+2(qn+q2)+l-(2qn+q2/2,)

simplifying for 5=1, then
Sj)s{n) — (w "1“1)(47i^-(-2ti -i~5)
Using either MODELGEN or the above equations the number of states
generated in each case is shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. State Space Size for three Reconfiguration Algorithms
n
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SRE
8
21
44
80
132
203
296
414
560

ARCE
17
51
107
199
333
517
759
1067
1449

DR
75
188
385
690
1127
1720
2493
3470
4675

3.5.2. Reliability Analysis
To illustrate the applicability of MODELGEN, several sets of failure rates
(«'«) have been selected and described in Table 3.3. For each failure rate set, the
Reliability (R), the MTTF and the Reliability Improvement Factors (RIF) have
been computed for a 4x4 processor array. The results obtained are tabulated in
Table 3.4 for both the SRE and the ARCE reconfiguration schemes.
In our analysis, we have used the PE failure rate as a reference normalized
with respect to the time unit such that at = 1 and with a coverage factor of c =

.99.

The computations were carried out using the MGRE (Model Generator and
Reliability Evaluator) software package described in [Lop89].

The main purpose of the tabulations in Table 3.4, is to show the
interdependencies of the different components now contained in the model. Notice
for example in column (e), the sensitivity to switch failures of the array with
SRE; i.e. columns (d) and (e) show the results obtained under similar failure rate
values except for switches; a reliability improvement factor (RIF) is calculated in
each case with respect to the simplex (sx) case, which corresponds to the case of
the failure of the array when a single processor fails; at t = .1 a RIF of 15.91 in
column (d) decreases to a RIF of 3.87 in column (e) as the failure rate of the
switches increases from 0.01 to 0.1. The same effect is less noticeable in the array
with ARCE; Compared to SRE, ARCE is less sensitive to failures in switches and
links. The Mean Time to Failure of the array with ARCE improves in each case
considerably with respect to the array with SRE. In summary column (b) shows
reliability results obtained considering PE’s failures only; on the other hand,
columns (c-d) show the effect of detailed modeling obtained under different failure
rate sets.

Table 3.3.- Failure Rates used for the results shown in Table 3.4.

Array

SRE

ARCE

col. _£i_
<*4 <X$
a
sx
b
1
.0
.0
.0
•0
c
1
.01 .0
.01
.0
d
1
.01 ,01 .01 .01
e
.01 .1
1
.01 .01
f
1
.01 .01 .1
.01
1
.01
.01
.0
.01
g
•- . - . a
sx
b
.0
1
.0
.0
.0
c
1 .01 ,0
.0
.01
d
.01 .01 .01 .01
1
e
1
.01 .1
.01
.1
f
1
.01 .01 .01 .1

Of7
Explanation
- . (*i=pe f.rate
.0
or2=101 f. rate
.0
or3=Switch f.rate
.01
Q'4=b.link f.rate
.01 ' Of5=h.link f.rate
.1
or6=sp.b.link f.rate
.0
■ cvg^c-switch f.rate
.0
.0
or4==r.switch f.rate
.01 .0
Q'5=c.b.link f.rate
.01 .01 Qf6=r.b.link f.rate
.01 .01 a7=sp.b.l.f.rate
.1
.1
sx=simplex
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Table 3.4.- Reliability and RIF’s for SRE and ARCE with c = .99 and
Failure Rates given in Table 3.3.
Array
R/RIF
SRE;
. R ■-

RIF

MTTF
ARCE
R

RIF
VMTTF

Time
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
_

a
.201897
.040762
.008230
.001662
.000335

.1
.2
;3
.4
.5
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
-

.201897
.040762
.008230
.001662
.000335

—
—
_ -

—
—
—
•- -

b
.97553
.889824
.74327
.578714
.428912
32.62
8.71
3.86
2.37
1.75
.510087
.986691
.977126
.969483
.961962
.95268
59.97
41.94
32.50
26.25
21.13
2.07274

c
.974196
.882997
.729796
.561119
.410413
3.93
8.20
3.67
2.27
1.70
.496435
.986227
.976359
.968212
.959513
.947997
57.95
4.58
31.20
24.66
19.22
1.90644

a
.949305
.832308
.663918
.492554
.347755
15.91
5.80
2.98
1.98
1.54
.447789
.985946
.975787
.966729
.955845
.940533
55.75
38.91
29.31
^2.27
16.61
1.74707

e
.792264
.580682
.3869727
.239752
.141386
3.86
2.30
1.62
1.32
1.17
.280379
.983185
.966740
.939159
.894073
.831963
46.78
28.50
16.17
9.38
5.93
1.02882

f
.901154
.703244
.489128
.315416
.194080
8.50
3.44
2.04
1.51
1.27
.33785
.985713
.974176
.959977
.93758
.903652
47.29
31.78
21.72
14.47
9.65
1.28279

Some reliability results of a 4X4 array with a DR scheme are shown in Table
3.6. Each column corresponds to a set of failure rates tabulated in Table 3.5.
Column a considers the reliability of the array when only PE’s (SPE’s) fail. The
remaining columns consider failures in all components in the model; thus, while in
column b a single failure rate is assumed for all components except PE’s column c
shows the effect of an increased failure rate of IL's and column d shows the effect
of an increased failure rate of multiplexers. The array shows increased sensitiyity
to failures in multiplexers than to failures in the IL's as shown by the reliability
and MTTF results shown in columns c and d. Because the DR scheme considers
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components of greater complexity (such as IL's and multiplexers) than those used
in SRE and ARCE, suitable comparison between the three schemes is given by
column b in Table 3.4 and column a in Table 3.6 in which only failures of PE’s
are considered.

Table 3.5.- Failure Rates used for the results shown in Table 3.6
col.
a
b
c
d

aP.E

aIOL

aIMX

aOMX

aBL

aIL

aSPE

iySlOL

aSMX

aSBL

1
1
1
1

.0
.01
.01
.01

.0
.01
.01
.1

.0
.01
.01
.1

.0
.01
.01
.01

.0
.01
.1
.01

1
1
1
1

.0
.01
.01
.01

.0
.01
.01
.1

.0
.01
.01
.01

Table 3.6.- Reliability Results for DR with c = 0.99 and
Failure Rates given in Table 3.5
time
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
MTTF

a
0.971744
0.832624
0.576951
0.326881
0.156860
0.346681

b
0.935879
0.744162
0,461321
0.228668
0.094770
0.30104

c
0.894698
0.680113
0.403064
0.191000
0.075675
0.2774

a
0.795178
0.487772
0.212808
0.070372
0.018868
0.207435

Let us consider a simplified model such as the one proposed in [WaF88b]
where the reliability of the array is expressed as R(t) = Rnr(t)XRr(t). The terms
Rnr and Rr refer to the reliability of non-redundant and redundant hardware
respectively. For the SRE case, let the number of PE’s in the array be the
redundant hardware, then:
n—1

R,(t)
1=0
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Consider the No. of IOL’s, HL’s and Switches as the non-redundant hardware,
then:
^

_ c-(2n2a2 + (n+n2)as + n(n+l)a5)i

Table 3.7 shows the reliability and MTTF results obtained with a set of
failure rates as shown in row g in Table 3.3 and with c —.99. The results given by
the simplified model show an underestimation of the reliability of a 4X4 array
with the SRE scheme as compared to the results obtained by solving the Markov
model generated by MODELGEN.

Table 3.7.- Reliability Results of Simplified and Detailed Modeling
time
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
MTTF

simplified
.915052
.782915
.613426
<,448006
.311454
.41571

Detailed
.954906
.848375
.687296
.51798
.371557
.464996

3.6. Summary
In this chapter the application of MSPN’s to generate Markov models for the
reliability analysis of processor arrays has been shown.

Three examples of

reconfiguration schemes were thoroughly analyzed using MGRE to generate the
models and reliability results. The analysis covers various components of the
array and their failure interdependencies. Comparative results show the state
space generated in each case. Reliability results derived for SRE and ARCE
compare these two schemes and their responses to different types of failures. A
possible MSPN representation of the DR scheme has been derived in which dense
areas are confined into a block (IL’s) to facilitate the analysis. It is assumed that
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failure statistics for these blocks are available.
The use of MSPN’s as a modeling technique implies that the reliability
estimation

of

any

fault-tolerant

processor

array

requires

a

complete

understanding of the fault behavior of the array in the presence of any type of
faults considered in the model. The influence of faulty components other than
PE’s in a processor array becomes more important as the ratio of area occupied
by PE’s decreases. In this case to predict the effect of faults in resources such as
switches, buses, links, etc., on the reliability of the array, detailed modeling is
justified. However, a complete characterization of the reconfiguration algorithm
is clearly needed; i.e., specifications such as resource sharing and type of resources
used to establish interconnections, etc.; particularly in cases of overlapping
routing paths where conflicts are more likely to occur.
Another advantage of a detailed modeling of an specific array is the
possibility of measuring the effect of redundant area increments in the overall
reliability of the array. The problem here is to be able to evaluate the effect on
the reliability of increased hardware complexity in terms of area requirements.
However, a detailed modeling of the array, causes a rapid growth of the state
space and traditional solution methods of reliability models require the
summation of large number of terms with different signs which increases the effect
of round-off errors as the system state space grows. Also, the generation of
absolute

large

numbers

increases

the

possibility

of

machine

overflow.

Fortunately, large state spaces can be solved Using randomization techniques
[GrM84]. On the other hand, approximation and reduction methods can be
applied for very large systems to derive lower and upper reliability bounds
[SmG86] without having to solve the entire model. In the latter case, suitable
criteria should be established to select those operational states whose
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performance-related measures are of interest.
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CHAPTER IV
NUMERICAL RELIABILITY ESTIMATION
AND A MODEL REDUCTION TECHNIQUE

4.1. Introduction
A fault-tolerant system can be modeled as a continuous-time discrete state
Markov process whose state space corresponds to the possible operational
configurations of the system. To derive reliability estimations at a given time, the
transient probabilities of the operational states of the Markov process are
required. Traditional solution methods require the summation of large number of
terms with different signs. Unfortunately, for large state spaces, the likelihood of
unreliable results increases as round-off errors are introduced in the solution
process. To overcome this problem the randomization technique has been used as
an alternate approach to the transient solutions of queueing systems proposed in
[Gra77a,Gra77b] and for the reliability calculation of fault tolerant systems
[Mil83]. In this chapter, implementation algorithms to estimate both reliability
and MTTF using the randomization technique are discussed. Furthermore, by
eliminating those states with low mean holding times, a reduced model is
obtained via equalization and lumping techniques [SmG86]. Once a reduced model
is obtained, the randomization procedure is applied to derive lower and upper
reliability bounds. The model reduction process requires an early knowledge of
the MTTF of the original model; therefore, an implementation algorithm to

67

obtain an exact evaluation of the MTTF is discussed. To optimize storage
requirements and to speed up calculations these algorithms are based on a single
vector representation of the transition rate matrix. This evaluation approach is
applicable for large state space models which are represented by an upper
triangular transition rate matrix. Applications are illustrated through examples of
evaluation of models generated by MGRE.
The second section of this chapter introduces a brief background on the
randomization algorithm. Implementation details and an algorithm for reliability
estimation are presented in the third section, the fourth section discusses a model
reduction technique using an exact estimation of the MTTF. Finally some
applications are reported.

4.2, The Randomization Algorithm
Let {X(t), i>0) be a continuous time homogeneous Markov process on a
finite state space S = {1,2, • • .* ,s}. The state probability vector at time t is
denoted by P(t) = [P1(t), P2(0> * * * >

], where P{(t) = P{X(t)=^i}, ieS.

The Markov process X(i) can be characterized by a set of differential
equations given in matrix form as follows:
p(t)-pm

(-a)

P(t)=P( 0)eAt

(4.2)

with a solution:

where P(0) corresponds to the initial probability vector and A is an riXri matrix
with elements aty which are the transition rates from state i to state j and
aU =

Yjatj
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A useful method [Gra77a,Gra77b] to compute the exponential in equation
(4.2) called uniformization or randomization is described next. Denote by Q the
transformation of the matrix A as follows:
(4.3)

+/
where A = max a,-,- ieS.

The resulting matrix Q is a transition probability matrix of a discrete-time
Markov chain (i.e. with entries 0<g,y<l).

Substituting A = —hi + AQ in

equation (4.2), we have:
P{t) = P{ 0)e~A<eA<<?

(4.4)

A series expansion of the exponential ekt® yields:
P(t)= Y,P{0)Qne-At^f.
n—0

nl

= Y,^(n)e -At mn
n\
n =0

(4.5)

where $(n) = P(0)Qn is a probability vector of a discrete Markov process with a
transition matrix Q.
In the probabilistic sense the uniformization algorithm can be interpreted as
follows [Mil83]: let
matrix Q and

n = 0,1,2, • * * } be a Markov chain on S with transition
0} be a Poisson process with rate A; assume both

processes are independent of'each other. Then the process

t>0} is a

Markov process with a transition matrix Q with an initial probability state P (0)
and therefore identical to X(t). Conditioning over the number of occurrences of
the Poisson process in [0, i ] and using the law of total probability, we have that
for a given state i:
/>,(<) = P{X(e)=i}

(4.6)
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= />{^(<) *=

= n}

OO
= £ PiYN(t)=i I N(t)=n}P{N(t)=n}
n=0
oo-

- £P{r„=i}e

Af (AQ»

n!

n= 0

Defining $t(n) = -P{Tn == ■*} and $(n) = [^(n), $2(^)7 •••], then equation (4.5)
results.

4.3. Implementation Details
The implementation of the uniformization procedure calls for the calculation
of #(n) and P{N(t)—n}. Since Q is a stochastic matrix, converges and <f>(n) can
be calculated recursively by:
$(0) =P(0)
$(n+l) = $(n)Q

(4.7)

The Poisson probability of exactly n events in an interval of length t can be
computed directly.

An advantage of the uniformization procedure is that

precision errors can be bounded by the user. The infinite series is truncated at
some point n = m, such that the complementary cumulative value remains below
a prescribed bound e; i.e., for every transient state in the system we must have:
1

n,—A t
m (A tye
E
nl,
r*=0

<6

Let | 4>(n) | denote the norm of the vector <I>(n). Since f $(n) | <j $(m) ['
for any n>rn, the following stopping rule can be used:

l*(n)l(i-£

ra=0

(A*)

n „ —At

nl

-)<e

(4.8)

Other advantage of this algorithm is its numerical stability. Calculations
involve only nonnegative numbers.
In [GrM84] an implementation algorithm of (4.7) for sparse matrices is
presented. Sparse matrices are transformed to a vector representation to minimize
storage requirements and speed up calculations.
The matrix representations of the models generated via an MSPN
representation of fault-tolerant processor arrays, exhibit the following features:
they are large, sparse and upper triangular. Therefore a vector representation is
simplified and an algorithm similar to that of [GrM84] has been implemented to
calculate 4>(n). An estimation of the MTTF is obtained using the following
relations:
1 00
>j'f'.W

"i

iLn= 0

. .

MTTF
::

.

. .
*=0

The summation to derive <J,- is truncated when e is reached.

4.3.1. Reliability Estimation Procedure
An algorithm to derive state probabilities for several time points is outlined
below. The following parameters and notation are used;

it

— initial time; h —

length of interval; ni = Number of intervals; E[j] stores the cumulative Poisson
probability value ^[y] at a time t derived in terms of the index j; ]P {j} stores the
state probabilities at a time t which it is derived in terms of the index f,

Procedure STATEJPROBS
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Inputs: it, h, ni
Outputs: Vectors P[j]; j=0,l, ..., ni
Begin
n=0;
calculate $(0) and j $(0) j
for j=0,l,2 ... ni, do
E [j]. = bj
P[j] =0;
end
ok = 1
while ok do
ok = 0
for j=0,l,2 ... ni, do
t = it+hXj
e-M(W
nl
p[j] =p[j] + $(n)x£[y]
if | $(ra) j X(l—E\j])<e do

E{j}=E\j}+m
ok — T
end
end for
if ok do
n = n+1
calculate $(») and | $(n) |
end
end while
end procedure

The norm of vector P[j] gives the reliability estimation at time t. Notice
that the vector $(n) which is common for all intervals, is calculated only once.
The algorithm stops when all intervals have reached the stopping rule contained
in the if statement.
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4.4. Model Simplification
Given the Markov model, an exact derivation of the MTTF is possible which
can give us an ’apriori’ knowledge of the stochastic behavior of the Markov chain
with respect to different failure rates. This suggests a possible state space
reduction based on the contribution of each state to the overall MTTF. The
randomization algorithm can then be applied based on a reduced transition rate
matrix. Leakage equalization techniques as presented in [SmG86] refer to the
procedure by which all transitions to the failure state from all or a set of
operational states, are modified to have a single value. The resulting model can be
reduced by lumping those states with the same leakage value into a single state
with a single transition to the failure state. Thus, equalization of transitions out
of those states which exhibit very low mean holding times followed by a lumping
procedure, reduces the state space of the model to yield a model whose solution
accuracy depends on the number of states eliminated and the transition rates
involved. To assess the accuracy of the solution, lower and upper bounds are
estimated and MTTF results are compared with those of the original model.

4.4.1. MTTF Exact Derivation and Implementation Procedure
To compute the MTTF, we observe that the Laplace transform of equation
(4.1) can be expressed as follows
ATp — — P{s)
The entries of the vector p correspond to the mean holding time of each state.
Evaluating at s =0 and using the fact that A is an upper triangular matrix each
entry of p can be obtained recursively as follows:
Pj = —TtPiaij
a) ivy

(4.9)
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I

Hence, each py is calculated by observing each column of A. The MTTF is then
calculated as follows:
MTTF = Y^Pj
y-o

(4.10)
.

Let u be a vector whose entries correspond to the non-zero entries of the
transition matrix A. Define r,={s,- *,} as a tuple associated with the ith row
(state) of A where s,- is an integer that indicates the number of transitions
(targets) from state i; i,- is a set of indices corresponding to the targets of state i.
An implementation algorithm to calculate the MTTF is outlined below.

Procedure MTTF
Inputs: T{ =

u

Outputs: mttf
Begin
k=0
for each row i, do
'/>[*] =0

k^k + si + l

end

■ V p[0] - p[0] . k

=0

for each row i, do
for(j—0; j<s,-; j++) do
PfeUU =p[*;[i]] +p[^[i]]Xp[*]X«[A:+i+l]
: - end ’
k — k + S{

end

+ 1
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end procedure
The complexity of this algorithm is 0(«2) where n corresponds to the
number of operational states of the Markov model represented by A. The first
loop initializes the vectors p and p. This initialization is needed to evaluate each
element of p in the main loop as the rows of A are being fetched from the buffer
ii. An advantage of this implementation results in the case of very large models
in which on-line memory is restricted. In this case, the rows of A and all TV’s can
be fetched directly from a file.

4.4.2. Model Reduction Process

A state *' is a highly probable state if p[ij>f, where f is a user-given constant.
The model reduction process consists of lumping consecutive states that are nonhighly probable. The remaining states are systematically reindexed defining a new
reduced model. This method is well suited for large models that include failures of
spare components or other components with low failure rates. The failure of a
single spare component gives place to a new operational state in the Markov
model; large blocks of states can be generated with low transition rates due to the
failure of spare components; however other transitions to some of these states
may or may not turn them into a highly probable states; thus, eliminating states
based solely on the transition rates does not guarantee satisfactory results. By
this approach, the elimination of non-highly probable states is controlled by the
user via the selection of f, and the desired reliability bounds.
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4.4.3. Estimation of Reliability Bounds
It has been shown in [3mG86], that equalizing transitions to the failure state
{leakage) from.-.states in the entire model or a subset, results in a new model with
.conservative or optimistic

reliability estimations

depending whether the

equalization 's performed with the maximum or the minimum transition to the
failure state.
Let L be a subset of non-highly probable states; notice that there may be
several subsets or blocks of consecutive states with a p[i}<$ (leL). For a lower
bound a state A: is selected such that its leakage corresponds to the maximum
leakage:
^max = max,£i I

I

Likewise for an upper bound, a state keL is selected such that its leakage
corresponds to the minimum leakage:
^min = mintej^ j YjO'ij I
3

■ ■

The resulting model has a set L of states with the same leakage. All other
transitions to states out of L are eliminated. Thus, the set L can be lumped into
a single state keL with no change in the reliability estimation. The process is
repeated for each subset L that can be formed in the original model. The resulting
model is a reduced model with a reliability corresponding to a lower/upper bound
with respect to the original model.
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4.5. Applications
In this section the reliability plots for 4X4 and 10X10 AR.CE arrays are
shown to illustrate the lower and upper reliability bounds that result upon the
selection of the constant £. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the case of a 4X4 array;
Figure 4.1 corresponds to the case of f=.01 where the lower bound reliability
curve is shown with a MTTF =.911763 and the upper bound reliability curve with
a MTTF=2.95693; the exact reliability is also shown with a MTTF =1.28279.
Figure 4.2 shows the case of f=.005; in this case the lower bound and upper
bound reliability curves are closer to the exact reliability curve with
MTTF=1.1854 for the lower bound and MTTF—1.72181 for the upper bound.
While the original model contains 107 states, reduced models with f=.01 and
$■=.005 are obtained with 19 and 21 states respectively.

exact rel.(mttf= 1.28279)
ub. rel.(mttf=2.95693)
lb. rel.(mttf= .911763)

Fig. 4.1. ARCE 4X4 Exact Reliability (107 states) and
Lower and Upper Bounds (19 slates) with $ = .01
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exact rel,(mttf= 1.28279)
ub. rel.(mttf—1.72181)
lb. rel.(mttf=1.1854)

Figure 4.2. ARCE 4X4 Exact Reliability (107 states) and
Lower and Upper Bounds (21 states) with £=.005

A 10X10 ARCE array will be represented by a more complex model with
1449 states with a MITF =1.53484. The plots in Figures 4.3-4.5 show the
reliability approximations obtained upon the selection of three different constants
£. Figure 4.3 shows the results obtained with £=.001 with a MTTF=1.23601 for
the lower bound curve compared to a MTTF=1.67142 for the upper bound curve;
these results correspond to a reduced model with 44 states. Figure 4.4 shows the
results obtained with £=.0005 with a MTTF=1.28975 for the lower bound curve
compared to a MTTF=1.55848 for the upper bound curve; the reduced model in
this case contains 47 states. In Figure 4.5 £=.0001 with a MTTF=1.52796 for the
lower bound curve compared to a MTTF=1.54118 for the upper bound curve;
these results correspond to a reduced model with 47 states; As the lower and
upper MTTF values come closer to the exact MTTF, the reliability curves
coincide giving an indication of the real reliability values without having to solve
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the entire model.

.........

ub. rel.(mttf= 1.67142)

-------

lb. rel.(mttf= 1.23601)

exact rel.(mttf= 1.53484; 1449 states)

Fig. 4.3. ARCE 10X10 Lower and Upper Bounds (44 states)
with £ = .001

4.6. Summary
In summary, the general randomization procedure can be used to estimate
the reliability of very large models. Using an early estimation of the MTTF of the
entire model, fast reliability results can be obtained via the solution of a reduced
model. By comparing the mean holding time of each state in the original model,
every subset of consecutive states is lumped into a single state. The set of states
created by this process is then aggregated with the remaining states to form a
new

reduced model.

A systematic reindexing is carried out and the

randomization procedure is applied to Obtain lower and upper reliability bounds.
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....... .

ub. rel.(mttf= 1.55848)

-------

lb. rel.(mttf= 1.28975)

exact rel.(mttf= 1.53484; 1449 states)

Fig. 4.4. ARCE 10X10 Lower and Upper Bounds (47
with <r = .0005
Thus, the model reduction process is straightforward and transparent to the user.
The solution of the new model corresponds to a lower bound if the state
replacement is based on the maximum leakage to the failure state; a minimum
leakage replacement yields an upper bound solution.

To illustrate the

applicability of this method, solutions of small and large models were shown.
One contribution of the work outlined in this chapter consists of the
implementation of an algorithm to evaluate reliability models. An additional
contribution consists of the possibility of obtaining approximate reliability
estimations of large processor arrays; i.e., using reduced models, lower and upper
bounds can be obtained. However, a drawback in the reduction process is the
fact that a matrix representation is required for an early estimation of the MTTF.
Thus the need to reduce storage requirements through a vector-like representation
is justified. However it seems reasonable to further explore (in future research)
features such as upper triangularity and sparseness of the transition matrix to
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.........

ub. rel.(mttf= 1.54118)
lb. rel.(mttf= 1.52796)

exact rel.(mttf= 1.53484; 1449 states)

Fig. 4.5. AR.CE 10X10 Lower and Upper Bounds (57 states)
with f = .0001
calculate the MTTF and select the desired states during the construction of the
reachability graph without the need to store the entire model. At this point the
only advantage is reaching a solution in shorter time.

CHAPTER V
HIERARCHICAL ARRAYS

5.1; introduction
In this chapter, 2-level hierarchical structures are analyzed. The components
of the hierarchy are fault-tolerant processor arrays that support any of the
folio-wing reconfiguration algorithms: DR, RR and RCR. DR refers to the direct
reconfiguration scheme; the RR (Row Replacement) scheme is a variation of the
SRE Scheme such that the size of the array remains constant throughout its
operational life and can tolerate only a number of faulty processing elements
corresponding to the number of spare rows. The RCR (Row or Column
Replacement) scheme is a variation of the ARCE scheme such that the size of the
array remains constant throughout its operational life and it has a given number
of spare rows and spare columns; the number of faults tolerated corresponds to
the number of spare rows and columns. The choice of non-degradable processor
arrays allows the analysis of several hierarchical schemes by using a given
reconfiguration scheme in any place in the hierarchy. Although several measures
can be used to compare several schemes, the use of the MTTF permits the
comparison of a large number of schemes and helps in determining the effects of
detailed modeling in a particular hierarchical scheme; for this purpose, the results
obtained are grouped in two tables. One table describes a set of MTTF’s obtained
when only PE’s fail. A second table describes results obtained when faults of
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several component types are considered. To observe a more detailed behavior in
their reliability some hierarchical schemes are selected from the MTTF tables.

5.2. Taxonomy of Hierarchical Schemes
Let H = <S,K> denote a given hierarchical scheme where S refers to a set
whose elements identify the reconfiguration algorithms used at different levels in
the hierarchy. The subarray size at each level is specified by K as follows:
K

—

(ft1, ft2 j • • • > ftfcj

i.e., at the fth level the subarray is of size ft,-. The subarray sizes satisfy the
product:
k
II= »
/

-

»=1

where n corresponds to the size of a single level processor array. Thus, in a given
hierarchical structure, a subarray at the tth level is of size n,- and it is formed
with subarrays of size

; the subarray at the fth level is implemented using the

reconfiguration scheme in the fth position of the set S. For example, if ft =16, one
possible representation of a 3-level structure implemented with only an x
reconfiguration scheme is:
<(a;, z,x), (2,2,4 j>
which indicates that at each level the array supports the reconfiguration scheme x
and that in the first level the size of the subarray is 2, in the second level the size
is also 2 and in the third level the array is composed of 4 subarrays,
Note that if there are m different reconfiguration schemes and each can fit at
any level in the hierarchical array, then with respect to S there are mk possible
hierarchical configurations. Thus, the selection of an optimal configuration must
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correspond to an optimal value of a measure of interest such as MTTF, Mission
Time, Performability, etc. An analytical determination of an optimal hierarchical
configurations is addressed in [WaF88b].
To estimate the reliability and MTTF of a k-level hierarchical array, the
following criteria are used:
1)

The failure rate of a processing unit (subarray) at the ith level is estimated
in terms of the MTTF of the subarray at the (i-l)th level, and denoted as:
_

1

~~ MTTF^i-i

(5.1)

where y denotes the name of the reconfiguration scheme used in the (i-l)th
level.
2)

The failure rate of component types other than processing units at the jth
level is assumed to be proportional to the failure rate of the corresponding
component type at the (i-l)th level such that:
<*i,i =

(5*2)

the subindex i refers to the component type i at the jth and (j-l)th levels; as
defined above, the term ny_i corresponds to the size of the subarray at the
(j-l)th level. Hence, using this criteria the complexity of a component type is
assumed to increase linearly with respect to the same component type in a
single level array. Also, the increasing complexity of interconnections as the
level of the hierarchy increases is taken into account.

5.3. Fault-Tolerant 2-level Hierarchical Arrays

The use of three different reconfiguration schemes gives a total of 32 = 9
possible choices for a 2-level hierarchical Scheme. The schemes used are the DR
scheme which was analyzed previously, the RR scheme and the RCR scheme. The
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RR and the RCR schemes are a variation of the SRE and ARCE schemes
respectively, in the sense that the size of the array remains constant throughout
its operational life. Both schemes will tolerate a number of faulty PE’s equal to
the number of spare rows and columns provided. Since the DR scheme analyzed
in chapter 2 considers only one spare row and one spare column, for compatibility
two spare rows are considered in the RR scheme and one spare row and one spare
column in the RCR scheme.
All results in each table assume a coverage factor c — .99; each PE in the
first level and in single-level arrays is assumed to fail at a rate otpg = .01; each
component of every other type is assumed to fail at a rate 100 times less than
that of a single PE.
The MTTF’s obtained for single-level arrays are shown in Table 5.1, for several
array sizes. For each reconfiguration scheme, these results show the effect of the
size of the array on the MTTF when only PE’s fail and with detailed modeling.
High MTTF’s of the DR scheme with respect to RR and RCR, reflect the fact
that a failure in the DR leads to a single PE substitution; in the RR scheme a
single PE failure leads to the substitution of a complete row; in the RCR, a single
PE failure causes a row or a column substitution. Notice that the RCR case
contains one extra spare processing unit with respect to RR, however, this has the
tendency to decrease the MTTF because while in the RR case the failure of any
spare unit implies the elimination of n units, in the RCR case however, n-j-1 units
are eliminated. Another conclusion that can be drawn from Table 5.1 is the fact
that the MTTF of nXn processor arrays with a fixed structure decreases as the
size n of the array increases.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the results for every possible set 5; for n = 64, each
entry displays the MTTF corresponding to a particular set K.

Table 5.2
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tabulates the MTTF’s obtained when only PE’s fail and Table 5.3 considers
detailed modeling in which other component types in the array can fail. For
simplification SBL’s in every scheme are assumed fault-free. However SBL’s that
become active can fail and their complexity increases in the second level according
to the size of the subarray in the first level. An immediate advantage of a 2-level
hierarchical structure can be seen by comparing the MTTF of a single-level 64 X
64 processor array with any reconfiguration scheme (last row in Table 5.1) with
any entry in Tables 5.2 and 5.3; he., except for some cases (single level 64X64 DR
array), most 2-level choices yield and improvement in its MTTF with respect to
the single-level structure. Hierarchical arrays implemented with the DR scheme
in at least one level show an improvement in their MTTF with respect to those
arrays implemented with RR and/or RCR. Examine, for example, the row
corresponding to RR implemented with DR; it is interesting to note the MTTF
improvement with the size of the processing units implemented with DR. Two
factors influence this effect: 1) the loss in MTTF due to the size increments of the
subarray (with DR) are compensated with the gain in MTTF with a lower
dimension of the array in the second level implemented with RR; 2) the
probability of survival of arrays with DR increases with the size of the array
[SaS86a]. This factors also explain the case of (dr,dr) which shows the best MTTF
of all the possibilities.
To observe the reliability behavior of hierarchical arrays with DR the
following cases are plotted in the figures indicated.
In Figure 5.1 the reliabilities of the schemes ((dr,rr), (4,16)), ((dr,rr), (8,8)) and
((dr,rr), (16,4)) are compared. In this set, the second level is implemented with
RR with subarrays implemented with DR. The best structure on this set consists
on 4X4 arrays with RCR with 16X16 DR subarrays.
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Figure 5.2 plots the reliabilities of the set: ((dr,rcr), (4,16)), ((dr,rcr), (8,8)) and
((dr,rcr), (16,4)).
Figure 5.3 plots: ((rr,dr), (4,16)), ((rr,dr), (8,8)) and ((rr,dr), (16,4)).
Figure 5.4 plots: ((rcr,dr), (4,16)), ((rcr,dr), (8,8)) and ((rcr,dr), (16,4)).
Figure 5.5 plots the set ((dr,dr), (4,16)), ((dr,dr), (8,8)) and ((dr,dr), (16,4)) which
correspond to the most reliable structures for the set of failure rates specified
previously.

Table 5.1.-MTTF’s for Single-level Fault-tolerant Processor Arrays

n
1
2
4
8
16
32
64

rr
182.35
53.7925
15.292
4.164
1.0951
.28152
.071419

PE fails only
rcr
174.126
52.4267
15.1283
4.14886
1.09393
.281434
.071413

dr
157.668
92.2377
34.6681
12.1023
4.24583
1.49453
.525113

rr
166.083
49.9527
14.3604
3.93578
1.03883
.267567
.067945

detailed modeling
rcr
155.786
48.0654
14.0419
3.8755
1.02526
.26422
:
.0671025

dr
138.393
81.1081
30.7144
10.7263
3.72798
1.28742
.438697

Table 5.2.- MTTF Results for Several 2-level Hierarchical Arrays with
where only Processing Units fail.
Reconf.
Schemes
(rr,rr)
(rcr,rr)
(dr,rr)
(rr,dr)
(rcr,dr)
(dr, dr)
(rr,rcr)
(rcr,rcr)
(dr,rcr)

(1,64)
.13022
.12436
.112604
.957468
.914358
.827933
.130211
.12435
.112596

(2,32)
.15144
.14759
.259664
.803936
.783526
1.37851
.15139
.147546
.259588

(4,16)
.16746
.16567
.379654
.649272
.642312
1.47195
.167284
.165493
.379246

(8,8)
.17339
.172758
.50394
.503938
.502108
1.46466
.172758
.17213
.502108

(16,4)
16746
.167284
.649272
.379653
.379248
1.47195
.165671
.165493
.64323

(32,2)
• . .15144

.15139
.803946
.259664
■.259588,

1.12418
.14759
.147546
.783532

»=64

(64,1)
.13022

.13021
.957464
.112604
-.412596'
.827932
.12436
.12436
.914359
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Table 5.3.- MTTF Results for Several 2-level Hierarchical Arrays with
with Detailed Modeling.
Reconf.
Schemes
(rr,rr)
(rcr,rr)
(dr,rr)
(rr,dr)
(rcr,dr)
(dr,dr)
(rr,rcr)
(rcr,rcr)
(dr,rcr)

11,64)
.109331
.103054
.09231
.640056
.634358
.570113
.10717
.110113
.0907614

12,32)
.13363
.128854
.210512
.64319
.622186
.959717
.131991
.127298
.206441

14,16)
.152519
.149238
.31536
,564834
.553217
1.11363
.151273
.148039
.310446

(8,8)
.160952
.158533
.425479
.457919
.451176
1.16951
.159744
.157351
.419627

116,4)
.157168
.15561
.548872
.352638
.348128
1.20048
.155163
.153161
.539103

(32,2)
.142994
.141214
,671337
.243947
.240927
1.12418
.174985
.137465
.650625

(64,1)
.123372
.121843
.778616
.106487
.105211
.665665
,117712
.116255
.739422

0 .8 -

R(t)

0

1

2

3

Fig. 5.1.- Reliability plots for (dr,rr) Arrays

n-64

4
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0.8-

0.6-

Fig. 5.2.- Reliability plots for (dr,rcr) Arrays
5.4. Summary
In this chapter, possible implementations of hierarchical arrays were
analyzed and compared in terms of their MTTF. A brief taxonomy was
introduced to relate the reconfiguration algorithms and sizes of the arrays at each
level in the hierarchy. For compatibility this analysis was carried out using fixedstructure arrays capable of supporting reconfiguration algorithms such as the DR,
RR and RCR. The last two being a variation of the SRE and ARCE
reconfiguration algorithms analyzed previously using MSPN’s.

'

Results were derived for cases in which only the processing unit fails and
when other component types fail also. The failure rate of a subarray used as a
processing unit in the immediately higher level was derived in terms of its MTTF.
The failure rates of any other component types were determined in terms of the
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0.8-

0.6-

0 .2 -

Fig. 5.3.- Reliability plots for (rr,dr) Arrays
size of the processing units and the failure rates used in the immediately lower
level. At the first level, the failure rates are chosen by the user. The results shown
correspond to a failure rate of a processing element in the first level of .01
failures per time unit; detailed modeling assumes failure rates for any other
component type of .0001 failures per unit time. For the cases analyzed, the
MTTF decreases as the size of the array increases. However any combination for a
hierarchical implementation renders an improvement in its MTTF with respect to
a single-level implementation with the same number of PE’s. Comparing all the
possible hierarchical implementations the ones with DR as a component in the
hierarchy render better results; particularly, for the failure rates chosen, the
(dr,dr) structures show better MTTF results.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

In this report, a systematic method to construct Markov models to analyze
fault-tolerant processor arrays was presented. Since the proposed method rests on
the premise that a fault-tolerant processor array can be modeled by a Stochastic
Petri Net, a modified version of Stochastic Petri Nets referred to as MSPN’s is
proposed to model the fault behavior of processor arrays in the presence of
failures of components of different types. An MSPN model contains all the
information pertaining to the processor array structure and a specific
reconfiguration scheme such that the derivation of a detailed Markov model is
straightforward. Attributes associated with the transitions in an MSPN model
include a probability distribution generated in terms of the number of faulty
components in each operational marking. This probability distribution includes
probabilities of reconfiguration which together with other attributes, establish a
mapping from transitions in the MSPN to transition rates in the corresponding
Markov model. Specific reconfiguration algorithms such as SRE, ARCE and DR
were analyzed. Reliability results for these three schemes were derived. The
analysis

covers

interdependencies.

several

components

Analytic

of

expressions

the

array

to

evaluate

and

their

failure

probabilities

of

reconfiguration for each scheme were derived. These expressions involve complex
combinatorial analysis and for some reconfiguration schemes, simulation has been
used to obtain probabilities of reconfiguration. For the DR case, the results
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obtained via the analytical expressions derived, match those reported in the
literature.
A software package, MGRE (Model Generator and Reliability Evaluator)
which generates the Markov models and evaluates reliability, has been developed
[Lop89]. However, the user is expected to provide files with the probabilities of
reconfiguration. Since access to those files may be tailored according to particular
applications, the user is also expected to provide subroutines to access the
required values. Also, for complex reconfiguration schemes in which sequences of
transitions that fire immediately cannot be predetermined for all markings, the
user is required to provide subroutines that examine each marking in order to
determine the type of reconfiguration or any other parameter used in the selection
of a sequence. An extensive use of MGRE for different reconfiguration schemes
can lead to a better design of a user interface.
The intrinsic large models generated for even moderate array sizes, cannot be
easily solved using existing reliability evaluation packages due to numeric round
off errors introduced during the evaluation process. Also, the large numbers
involved in the solution process of large models may cause machine overflow. The
Solution proposed in this work is based on the general randomization procedure.
An algorithm was implemented using this procedure such that the solution of
fairly large models is possible. Furthermore, it is shown that given an early
estimation of the MTTF of the entire model, fast reliability results can be
obtained via the solution of reduced models.
Hierarchical arrays were also discussed as an application of MGRE. Several
2-level structures were compared using as processing units subarrays of different
dimensions and with different reconfiguration schemes. For compatibility, this
analysis includes processor arrays with a fixed-size structure; i.e., no performance
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degradation allowed. It was shown that hierarchical structures offer a good
potential to increase reliability with respect to single-level arrays with the same
number of processing elements.
The main contribution of this research consists of a procedure to analyze
fault-tolerant processor arrays using a more general approach and with an
optional modeling detail. Given the MSPN of a particular reconfiguration scheme,
Markov models of an array of any size can be derived for selected sets of failure
rates. Thus, several array architectures can be compared in terms of their
reliability and MTTF.
Detailed modeling preserves all the information of the structure of the array
in each operational state. Therefore, performability and other performance and
area related measures can be derived in terms of each operational state.
Furthermore, the approach presented in this thesis can be applied to analyze
other hardware systems such as computer networks, interconnection networks,
etc. '
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